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INTRODUCTION 
International law binds nation-states, but it is usually politicians who 
make the crucial decision whether to adopt or enforce international legal 
commitments.  Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, the logic and effica-
cy of international law should not be judged exclusively by the elevated 
yardstick of global cooperation or objective state interest.1  Rather, support 
 
*  Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.  For helpful commentary at an earlier 
stage of this project, I am grateful to William Howell and other participants at Northwestern University 
School of Law’s Searle Center Faculty Conference on Political Science and Law.  This Article also be-
nefited from comments from Daniel Abebe, Robert Ahdieh, Padideh Ala’i, Karen Alter, Harlan Cohen, 
Tom Ginsburg, Timothy Meyer, Hendrik Spruyt, Paul Stephan, Douglas Stinnett, Joel Trachtman, and 
John Yoo and from participants in the 2010 American Society of International Law’s International Eco-
nomic Law Interest Group Biennial Conference at the University of Minnesota Law School and the 
University of Georgia International Law Workshop.  I would also like to thank Jonell Goco for his ex-
cellent research assistance. 
1  For instance, a core claim of the liberal institutionalist school of thought in international relations 
is that international agreements provide mechanisms for achieving mutually beneficial cooperation 
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and opposition to international law should also be judged by another com-
pelling yardstick: the desire of politicians to retain power and advance their 
partisan policy preferences.  At some level, both international agreements 
and customary international law may require politicians to make conces-
sions that restructure the domestic institutional or policy landscape.  Some-
times, but not always, such concessions may alter the political leverage of 
one domestic group in favor of another.  Since partisan prospects for stay-
ing in power and advancing policy preferences may be affected by interna-
tional legal commitments, we may anticipate that support for international 
law will vary across both parties and electoral cycles. 
Unfortunately, we still know very little about when or how domestic 
partisan groups make the adoption and enforcement of international law 
more likely.  This problem is especially pronounced in our analysis of dem-
ocratic regimes.  Though there is now a growing academic consensus that 
democratic regimes are more likely than their nondemocratic counterparts 
to engage in international cooperation,2 there is little analysis of whether the 
propensity toward embracing international law among such democracies va-
ries across right-leaning and left-leaning governments.  To be sure, there is 
a rich social science literature that explores how interest groups influence 
international policy by lobbying political officials, but this literature does 
not usually analyze how this interest group dynamic interacts with domestic 
partisan politics.3  Moreover, much of the debate usually focuses on the pre-
ferences of domestic interest groups for specific policy outcomes rather 
than efforts to promote a political party’s ideological or electoral fortunes.  
Even when the role of parties in framing international legal issues is ac-
knowledged, it is usually treated as an exception to the conventional wis-
dom that politics “stop at the water’s edge.”4  
                                                                                                                           
among nation-states.  See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN 
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).  This institutionalist approach has been quite influential in 
international law scholarship attempting to explain why states bind themselves to international agree-
ments.  See JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL Law (2008); Kenneth 
W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 335 (1989); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 
24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1999); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgo-
vernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 205 (1993). 
2  See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace, 
93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 791 (1999); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs (pts. 
1 & 2), 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 323 (1983); Edward D. Mansfield et al., Why Democracies Cooperate 
More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements, 56 INT’L ORG. 477 (2002). 
3  See infra notes 2535 and accompanying text. 
4  See Joanne Gowa, Politics at the Water’s Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad, 
52 INT’L ORG. 307, 307 (1998) (finding no effect of the partisan composition of government on the pro-
pensity of the United States to use force from 1870 to 1992). 
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This Article advances a different perspective: that political parties—or 
partisan elites—will often embrace international legal commitments as a 
vehicle to overcome domestic obstacles to their policy and electoral objec-
tives.  In this picture, an incumbent regime may strategically use interna-
tional law to extend the scope of partisan conflict across borders in order to 
isolate the domestic political opposition and increase the influence of for-
eign groups or states that may be more sympathetic to the regime’s political 
objectives.  Alternatively, such a regime may support international legal 
commitments that it knows are likely to provoke intracoalitional conflict 
within the political opposition.  But just as a governing party may use inter-
national law to advance its domestic political objectives, the political oppo-
sition may exploit domestic institutions to thwart international legal 
commitments that strengthen the ruling regime and weaken its own posi-
tion.  Thus, rather than serve as a structure of mutually beneficial coopera-
tion, international law may often devolve into a zero-sum dynamic that 
simply reflects an extension of domestic political conflict by other means.  
This perspective assumes that political parties build reputations for ad-
dressing certain issues better than others and may seek to use international 
legal commitments to bolster those issues against the vagaries of domestic 
politics.  In other words, partisan officials may attempt to use international 
commitments to narrow the scope of future policy to their advantage and 
thus weaken the ability of a future hostile regime to pursue its preferred pol-
icy or electoral objectives.  For instance, a right-leaning government may 
support an international trade agreement that reduces tariff barriers not only 
because of policy preferences but also because such an agreement is likely 
to undercut the ability of a future left-leaning government to reward its loy-
al trade union constituencies.  Conversely, since left-leaning governments 
draw their base of support from labor and minority groups, such govern-
ments may be more open to negotiating and ratifying human rights agree-
ments because these agreements are likely to reinforce the power of their 
loyal constituencies and weaken the power of right-leaning domestic forces 
opposed to progressive social and economic reform.   
By highlighting the fragmented and issue-specific context in which 
partisan politicians strategically use international law, this Article chal-
lenges the commonly held intuition that parties of the left—or left-leaning 
elites—will tend to favor more international commitments and that parties 
of the right will tend to favor fewer international commitments.5  On the 
 
5  See DAVID HALLORAN LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE FOREIGN 
AID REGIME, 1949–1989, at 156–57 (1993) (describing left-leaning groups’ preference for foreign aid 
and right-leaning groups’ opposition); Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International In-
stitutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 291, 297308 (2000) (discussing conservative criticism of multilateralism 
within the context of the European Union).  Within the legal academy, the growing division between 
proponents and skeptics of a more robust international legal framework is usually framed in philosophi-
cal and not partisan terms.  See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Contemporary International Law: An ‘Empire of 
Law’ or the ‘Law of Empire’?, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 811, 812 (2009) (“Today’s legal academy, par-
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contrary, the politicians who accept or oppose international legal constraints 
on their authority come from all sides of the political spectrum, and they of-
ten do so because of the perceived political threats or opportunities arising 
from such constraints.  And although international legal commitments are 
often framed as institutional arrangements rather than as prescribed policy 
outcomes, partisan politicians tend to rank these commitments based upon 
their expectations regarding future policy outcomes.  Such expectations 
may depend on partisan beliefs regarding the likely preferences of other 
states that are party to the international commitment (or the elites within 
those states) as well as the preferences of actors who will ultimately have 
the authority to enforce or interpret such commitments. 
Nevertheless, a puzzle still remains.  If an incumbent government signs 
an international commitment that advances its partisan objectives, how can 
it be sure that the political opposition will honor such a commitment once it 
eventually comes into power?  Put differently, are international commit-
ments that run afoul of the partisan preferences of a successor regime elec-
torally sustainable?  The short answer is that they are often not; indeed, 
international commitments enacted by one partisan coalition are often sub-
sequently sabotaged or undermined by hostile successor governments.6  But 
does this mean that international agreements that yield significant distribu-
tive partisan consequences are invariably doomed to a short political shelf-
life?  Not necessarily.  The logic of partisan entrenchment suggests that the 
governments that enact partisan-friendly institutional arrangements will at-
tempt to take measures that reduce the chance of defection by their succes-
sors.  One such measure, which has been discussed extensively in the social 
science literature on domestic policy entrenchment, relies on creating politi-
cal feedback mechanisms that empower a broader coalition of interest 
groups and powerful elites, who then become vested in protecting the newly 
created institutional arrangement.7 
But although such reinforcing feedback mechanisms are undoubtedly 
important in the international context, they are hardly sufficient.  Because 
international legal commitments are often enacted and implemented in insti-
tutional environments that are fragile and highly contested, they are particu-
larly vulnerable to reversal by successor regimes that are hurt by such 
                                                                                                                           
ticularly in the United States, reflects a divide between traditional defenders of international legalism 
and revisionist upstarts who question the efficacy, or at the very least the democratic legitimacy, of both 
global treaties negotiated within multilateral institutions and the rules of custom that are backed by the 
international community.”). 
6  See infra notes 7073 and accompanying text. 
7  See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Com-
mitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 685–91 (2011) (theorizing that political feedback mechanisms encour-
age commitment to the Constitution); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study 
of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 262 (2000) (explaining why political actors create institutional 
constraints on their future choices).  For a discussion of how the psychological effect of political en-
dowment to interest groups also helps entrenchment, see Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and 
Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 82728 (1998). 
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commitments even when those commitments may also benefit a broad coa-
lition of international and domestic interests.  More importantly, if a succes-
sor government seeks to subvert an unfavorable international legal 
commitment, it does not necessarily have to exit the commitment formally; 
it may simply refuse to implement the provisions rigorously.  Thus, creating 
barriers to prevent a state from exiting an international commitment is not 
enough to guarantee its future efficacy. 
On the contrary, for a distributive international legal commitment to be 
sustainable across multiple electoral periods, it usually has to generate poli-
cy outcomes that benefit some politically salient members of the nonenact-
ing coalition.  Thus, insofar as a forward-looking incumbent government 
wants to increase the durability of an international commitment that ad-
vances its partisan objectives, it has an incentive to include provisions in the 
commitment that provide side payments to some members of the political 
opposition even if such benefits would not be enough to encourage the op-
position to seek to adopt the commitment on its own.8  Such defection-
proofing measures, which entail bundling together a diffuse range of issues 
in a specific international commitment, ensure that the nonenacting coali-
tion is not likely to view the commitment purely as an arrangement that 
confers one-sided benefits on its political adversaries because all political 
actors must take the good along with the bad.   
 Some caveats are in order.  This Article is not claiming that domestic 
support or opposition to international law in the United States is motivated 
entirely (or even mostly) by redistributive partisan objectives.  Indeed, do-
mestic groups—including partisan elites—may oppose or support an inter-
national agreement or a customary international law norm because of 
principled policy preferences largely detached from partisan considera-
tions.9  Nor is this Article claiming that all international agreements or 
norms of customary international law have redistributive or zero-sum con-
sequences in which certain domestic groups win and others lose.10  This Ar-
 
8  There is a literature in political science that discusses the role of the strategic side payments to 
domestic groups in the context of negotiating international agreements, but that literature tends to focus 
on domestic factional conflict defined broadly rather than the specific context of partisan conflict be-
tween an incumbent regime and the political opposition.  See, e.g., Christina L. Davis, International In-
stitutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization, 98 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 153, 153 (2004) (arguing that issue linkages in international trade agreements can “counteract[] 
domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening the negotiation stakes”); Frederick W. Mayer, Man-
aging Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments, 
46 INT’L ORG. 793 (1992) (analyzing the capacity of domestic factions to make side payments to one 
another in the context of an international negotiation and demonstrating that there is a strategic dimen-
sion to these side payments).   
9  For instance, domestic groups may be concerned about enhancing democratic accountability, safe-
guarding against the centralization of governmental authority, resolving global cooperative or coordina-
tion dilemmas, or increasing global economic welfare. 
10  Some international agreements or norms of customary international law may create mutual gains 
that make all domestic groups better off.  See infra Part II.  Or more plausibly, certain international legal 
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ticle simply focuses on instrumental partisan motivations in the context of 
international legal commitments that have distributive consequences be-
cause these partisan motivations have been largely ignored or sidelined in 
the literature. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I critically evaluates the extant 
literature on the domestic sources of international law preferences.  Part II 
proposes a theoretical framework for understanding partisan support and 
opposition to international law.  This Part suggests that, contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, international commitments and institutions do not always 
simply operate as structures for achieving global cooperative outcomes but 
sometimes operate as structures that enable competing partisan groups to 
advance their preferred policy and electoral objectives.  Part II also explores 
the calculus of competing partisan groups and identifies the domestic insti-
tutional conditions that influence when these groups are likely to support or 
oppose international law. 
Part III uses two case studies from contemporary American history—
the controversies surrounding the efforts to ratify human rights treaties in 
the 1950s and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) agree-
ment in 1993—to shed light on how distributive partisan politics can help 
spawn international law and limit its efficacy and scope. 
In the first case, strong opposition by Republicans and conservative 
Southern Democrats helped doom the ratification of human rights agree-
ments favored by President Truman, a Democrat, and other progressives in 
the early years after the creation of the United Nations.  These draft human 
rights treaties failed in part because their progressive Democratic supporters 
did not have much leeway to structure the covenants in a way that would 
co-opt Republican and Southern Democratic opposition through side pay-
ments.  Put differently, the veil of ignorance behind these early U.N. human 
rights treaties was sufficiently thin that key Republicans and conservative 
Southern Democrats realized that they would become unambiguous losers if 
such human rights agreements were ratified and became domestically bind-
ing in the United States.  Eventually, conservative opponents of these post-
war treaties in the Senate sought to amend the Constitution in a manner that 
would make treaty ratification more difficult.  By contrast, opposition by 
Democratic labor constituencies to the adoption of NAFTA in 1993 was 
partly muted not only by the inclusion of side agreements that benefited 
other Democratic constituencies but also by the growing probusiness wing 
of the party.  The Republicans, on the other hand, tried to exploit the intra-
partisan conflict within the Democratic Party over NAFTA for electoral ad-
vantage. 
                                                                                                                           
agreements may help some and hurt others but nonetheless expand the size of the pie.  In such cases, the 
winners may be able to compensate the losers through negotiation and thus reach a Pareto frontier in 
which everyone is better off.   
105:635  (2011) Strategic Globalization 
 641 
Part IV critically considers an alternative account of partisan differenc-
es over international law that may reflect ideological disagreements over the 
erosion of sovereignty that fall along a left–right spectrum.  The Conclusion 
briefly discusses some normative and policy implications of the partisan 
framework for contemporary international law debates. 
I. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
Domestic-level explanations of why states enter into international legal 
commitments can be broken down loosely into three categories: state-
centered, society-centered, and state–society relations approaches.11  One 
prominent variant of the state-centered approach, liberal institutionalism, 
assumes that states enter into international agreements to resolve coopera-
tion and coordination dilemmas inherent in a system of international 
anarchy.12  More generally, this approach assumes that international organi-
zations and treaty regimes represent structures of cooperation in which all 
participants realize mutual gains.13  Yet a new generation of political 
science research has called into question some of the basic assumptions of 
the liberal institutionalist approach.  First, some scholars have questioned 
the notion that multilateral agreements and international institutions tend to 
represent structures of cooperation that benefit all participants rather than 
structures of power.14  For instance, Lloyd Gruber has argued that certain 
states may join international regimes or institutions even when they expect 
to be worse off because certain powerful countries have sufficient “go-it-
alone” power that they can alter the status quo for less powerful states.15  In 
this picture, once powerful states decide to band together to form a new in-
stitutional regime, such as an international trade organization, other less 
 
11  See Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of Inter-
national Bargaining, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY 3, 56 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993).  Another 
level of analysis, which is not discussed here, is that of international explanations that treat states as uni-
tary actors responding to external forces and incentives.  See id.  This Article brackets any discussion of 
such international explanations not because they are irrelevant but because the focus of this Article is on 
exploring the domestic sources of state preferences in the international arena. 
12  See KEOHANE, supra note 1, at 7–10; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations 
Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 717, 730–31 (1995). 
13  Although states play a key role in the liberal institutionalist framework, they are often simply de-
picted as surrogates for societal preferences.  See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 12, at 728 (arguing that 
state behavior is determined “not by the international balance of power . . . but by the relationship be-
tween . . . social actors and the governments representing their interests, in varying degrees of complete-
ness”). 
14  See LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS (2000); see also Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002) (arguing that although trade 
rounds have been launched through law-based bargaining, hard law is generated when a round is closed, 
and rounds have been closed through power-based bargaining in which the preferences of the United 
States and the European Community dominate). 
15  See GRUBER, supra note 14, at 910.  
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powerful states that oppose such a regime might be faced with a fait ac-
compli.  These less powerful states then face a choice between what they 
might view as an unfavorable option (acceding voluntarily to the new re-
gime) and an even worse alternative (facing the costs of being excluded).16  
Second, and more broadly, scholars have also criticized the paradigm’s fail-
ure to integrate sufficiently the role of domestic distributive politics into the 
analysis of state motivation at the international level.17  Here, the argument 
is not that analyzing states as rational unitary actors is fundamentally defec-
tive but that disaggregating the state further into its societal components is 
sometimes necessary when international legal commitments have domestic 
distributive implications.18 
Moving beyond the emphasis on state preferences, several new socie-
ty-based explanations attempt to understand the evolution of legal norms 
through the forces that shape the identities and preferences of domestic ac-
tors within each state.19  In these so-called constructivist or sociological ac-
counts,20 the preferences of such elites regarding specific international legal 
 
16  See id. 
17  For a summary of different approaches to international law as well as criticisms of each approach, 
see G. John Ikenberry et al., Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Poli-
cy, 42 INT’L ORG. 1 (1988).  See also Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agree-
ments, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 502 (2004) (“By focusing primarily on cooperation, the current 
interdisciplinary approach neglects the domestic policy motivations for forming international agree-
ments.  This research agenda needs to be supplemented by an analysis of the domestic and distributional 
politics of international law.”). 
18  For instance, some commentators have attempted to explain international behavior by integrating 
both domestic and international factors.  See, e.g., Nitsan Chorev, A Fluid Divide: Domestic and Inter-
national Factors in US Trade Policy Formation, 14 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 653 (2007); Tonya L. Put-
nam, Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere, 
63 INT’L ORG. 459 (2009) (arguing that domestic courts in liberal democracies can influence outcomes 
and processes at the international level when they exercise their jurisdiction extraterritorially).   
19  See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 63946 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey In-
ternational Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2656–57 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA 
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
AGREEMENTS (1995), and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
(1995)); Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practice: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 3–5 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 
1999); see also Roger P. Alford, The Nobel Effect: Nobel Peace Prize Laureates as International Norm 
Entrepreneurs, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 61 (2008) (exploring how Nobel Laureates have played an especially 
important role as preference-creators in the development of international legal norms).  For a good dis-
cussion of norm diffusion in an international legal context, see Katerina Linos, How Can International 
Organizations Shape National Welfare States?, 40 COMP. LEGAL STUD. 547 (2007). 
20  Although constructivism is largely a positive theoretical framework that seeks to explain state be-
havior, it also has strong normative implications.  Generally, constructivists tend to be more optimistic 
about the potential of using international law to achieve desirable policy objectives.  As such, some 
scholars have described constructivism as a subset of a universalist approach to international law.  See 
Daniel Abebe, Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal Incorporation and International 
Human Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2007) (“The universalist theory holds that interna-
tional law has an independent, exogenous [e]ffect on state behavior.  Since States obey international law 
105:635  (2011) Strategic Globalization 
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commitments are rarely fixed and often evolve based on the activities of 
transnational activists or norm entrepreneurs who use acculturation or per-
suasion to secure acceptance of specific norms and legal commitments.21  
Thus, rather than take the preferences of individual decisionmakers as giv-
en, this approach argues that such decisionmakers will be particularly sus-
ceptible to emulating behavioral patterns in others that seem modern or 
sophisticated. 
Although constructivism helps illuminate why certain domestic actors 
favor the spread of international laws or norms, it is nonetheless incom-
plete.  First, the constructivist account does not sufficiently appreciate the 
possibility that politicians who are primarily motivated by electoral ambi-
tions or narrow policy objectives may cloak their preferred international le-
gal commitments in the high-minded language of norm diffusion or 
socialization.22  Second, constructivists neglect the possibility that partisan 
ideological considerations may influence the ability of norm entrepreneurs 
to persuade or acculturate policy makers.23  In other words, certain norma-
tive ideals, such as social and labor rights, may find more fertile ground for 
reception among certain domestic partisan groups than among others.  And 
even when particular states agree to implement human rights ideals in the 
                                                                                                                           
out of legal obligation, universalists tend to encourage the greater integration of [customary international 
law] into domestic legal regimes and the use of [customary international law] to improve human rights 
practices around the world.”). 
21  See Asher Alkoby, Theories of Compliance with International Law and the Challenge of Cultural 
Difference, 4 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 151, 179 (2008) (“Several constructivists who elaborate on the 
notion of persuasion borrow from Habermas’ theory of communicative action.  Rather than treating in-
ternational talk as ‘cheap,’ it is posited that actors may be engaged in deliberation for the purpose of 
changing the minds of others.” (footnote omitted)).  In contrast to persuasion, however, Goodman and 
Jinks describe a process of norm internalization by acculturation whereby actors mimic the beliefs and 
behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.  See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 19, at 638. 
22  For instance, as Ian Hurd has shown in his treatment of the U.N. sanctions regime against Libya, 
states can manipulate the legitimacy and norms associated with international institutions to their strateg-
ic advantage.  See Ian Hurd, The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 
1992–2003, 59 INT’L ORG. 495 (2005).  More recently, Jelena Subotić has also argued that warring eth-
nic factions in the former Yugoslavia were likely to invoke the rhetoric of international norms selective-
ly in circumstances where it suited their ambitions to obtain power.  See Jelena Subotić, Hijacked 
Justice: Domestic Appropriation of International Norms 34–38 (Human Rights & Human Welfare 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 28, 2005), available at http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/
workingpapers/2005/28-subotic-2005.pdf. 
23  For instance, the constructivist framework does not necessarily account for why there would be 
variation in the internalization of international legal norms among different elite groups across and with-
in democratic states.  Indeed, the evidence of how international law norms influence political elites is 
decidedly mixed with certain studies showing some effect and others showing no effect at all.  Compare 
Liesbet Hooghe, Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few via International Socialization: A 
Case Study of the European Commission, 59 INT’L ORG 861 (2005) (finding weak socialization effects), 
with Risse & Sikkink, supra note 19, at 3–5 (finding a significant socialization effect).   
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abstract, it does not necessarily translate to any common understanding by 
competing partisan groups about what such ideals may mean in practice.24 
A second society-based account emphasizes the role that domestic in-
terest groups play in influencing international agreements by lobbying state 
officials.  Perhaps nowhere is this approach more evident than in the arena 
of international trade, which presumably pits domestic groups seeking 
access to foreign markets against import-competing groups.25  According to 
this account, the role of partisanship is somewhat inconsequential because 
politicians act as passive players who merely supply the trade policies de-
manded by the most politically influential domestic interest groups.26  
Beyond international trade, such accounts resonate in other circumstances 
where international agreements differentially affect the economic (or ma-
terial) interests of various domestic constituencies.27  In this picture, when 
 
24  As a growing amount of literature in social psychology and cognition theory suggests, partisan-
ship often plays a pervasive role in how individuals update their beliefs even when subject to shared ex-
periences of political reality.  See Brian J. Gaines et al., Same Facts, Different Interpretations: Partisan 
Motivation and Opinion on Iraq, 69 J. POL. 957 (2007) (observing that although surveyed respondents 
held similar and fairly accurate beliefs about facts regarding the Iraq war, interpretations of those facts 
varied across partisan groups in predictable ways); see also Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You 
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009) 
(describing an empirical study showing that factual beliefs are influenced by cultural identity). 
25  See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, 
63 REV. ECON. STUD. 265, 265 (1996) (stating theory of interactions between interest groups making 
campaign contributions and political parties setting policies); Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safe-
guard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 255, 281–82 (1991) (explaining the existence of escape clauses through interest group theory); see 
also Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2010) 
(“[I]nternational cooperation is more likely to emerge when the interests of powerful states align and 
when concentrated and influential interest groups within those states support the agreement.  These fac-
tors are often used to explain why international cooperation in a given instance has been successful.  
Without their presence, the prospects for a WTO agreementor any other international treatyare 
dim.”); John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World Trade Constitution, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 546–48 (2000) (discussing the role of interest groups in hampering and encour-
aging international trade); Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retalia-
tion in the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
215, 223 (2005) (discussing the role of interest groups in enhancing WTO enforcement).  Indeed, some 
scholars have also argued that interest groups play a key role in government decisions to initiate litiga-
tion before the WTO.  See, e.g., GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC–PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003).  
26  See Helen V. Milner & Benjamin Judkins, Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is 
There a Left–Right Divide on Trade Policy?, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 95, 99 (2004) (discussing the absence of 
partisan factors in the interest group account of international trade policymaking).  
27  See Quan Li & Dale L. Smith, Testing Alternative Explanations of Capital Control Liberaliza-
tion, 19 REV. POL’Y RES. 28 (2005).  There is also a related literature that suggests that powerful coun-
tries will use international economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, to promote 
the broad material interests of their domestic commercial constituencies.  See, e.g., Thomas Oatley & 
Jason Yackee, American Interests and IMF Lending, 41 INT’L POL. 415 (2004).  Similarly, there are 
commentators who suggest that investors are taking advantage of a growing global market for securities 
regulation at the expense of national securities regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commis-
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the material benefits are concentrated and the costs diffuse, politically sus-
tainable agreements are more likely.28  One prominent version of this ac-
count explains the proliferation of international trade agreements in the 
twentieth century as a result of historical forces that increased the political 
salience of export groups seeking market access relative to import-
competing groups.29 
Another variant of constituency-driven explanations emphasizes the 
use of international legal agreements as precommitment devices, used to 
lock in democracy domestically.30  According to this account, elites or do-
mestic interests who negotiate democratic transitions worry that democratic 
benefits bargained for today may not endure because they cannot credibly 
commit future politicians to uphold the deal.  To overcome this commit-
ment problem, these elites attempt to entrench such domestic bargains in in-
ternational legal agreements with the expectation that the agreements 
cannot easily be undone by future politicians with antidemocratic prefe-
rences.31  This explanation is rooted in the reality of time-inconsistent prefe-
rences among political actors in transitional regimes who may be prone to 
sacrifice important democratic principles in the future either because of 
weak domestic institutions or the lack of a track record of liberal political 
values.  Thus, this account may not have broad explanatory power across 
different types of regimes.  Indeed, even the leading proponents of this ac-
count, Andrew Moravcsik and Tom Ginsburg, concede that the choices 
faced by political actors in designing international agreements differ fun-
damentally from those faced by actors in more established democracies.32  
                                                                                                                           
sion.  See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1435, 1435–36 (2008).  
28  Understandably, given that consumers tend to be unorganized compared to industry sectors, they 
are usually given short shrift in constituency-driven accounts of international trade agreements although, 
from a normative perspective, free trade is supposed to benefit consumers.  
29  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GILLIGAN, EMPOWERING EXPORTERS: RECIPROCITY, DELEGATION, AND 
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY (1997). 
30  See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law, 
38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707 (2006); Tom Ginsburg et al., Commitment and Diffusion: How and 
Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201; Andrew Moravc-
sik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 
217, 220 (2000); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000) (exploring how international political actors decide whether to 
use precise, legally binding international agreements or softer, weaker legal arrangements); Steven R. 
Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2055 
(2003) (discussing how distinctions between bona fide precommitments and weaker forms of self-
binding by state actors can offer insights of international legal relationships). 
31  See Moravcsik, supra note 30, at 220.  
32  See Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 712 (“International law, I argue, is a particularly useful device for 
certain kinds of states, namely those that are undergoing a transition to democracy.  By bonding the 
government’s behavior to international standards and raising the price of deviation, international law 
commitments in the constitution may help to ‘lock in’ democracy domestically by giving important in-
terest groups more confidence in the regime.”); Moravcsik, supra note 30, at 220 (“It follows that ‘self-
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There is also a related literature on constitutional diffusion, which argues 
that there is a positive relationship between economic liberalization and the 
diffusion of first generation rights, such as free speech and property rights.33  
Yet this latter literature does not focus on the spread or proliferation of in-
ternational law explicitly but rather on how global migration and invest-
ment flows influence the spread of constitutional rights across borders.  
Ultimately, these accounts do not usually focus on whether interna-
tional commitments may be supported or opposed instrumentally by politi-
cal parties—or partisan elites—to advance their policy or electoral 
objectives.  For the most part, the interest group account is primarily (if not 
exclusively) concerned with how international agreements affect discrete 
policy outcomes favored by specific domestic groups rather than how such 
agreements may affect the policy or electoral goals of major political par-
ties.34  On the contrary, the conventional wisdom is that domestic politics is 
radically different from foreign policy and that in international affairs parti-
sanship stops at the “water’s edge.”35 
Typically, the water’s edge thesis embraces a unitary model of state ac-
tion in which parties across the political spectrum share a common vision of 
foreign policy and in which the political opposition does not have much to 
gain by subverting the foreign policy agenda of the ruling regime.36  But as 
many commentators have observed, bipartisan consensus on foreign affairs 
in the post-Cold War era is becoming less common; indeed, foreign policy 
is increasingly characterized by the same kinds of ideological or partisan 
                                                                                                                           
binding’ is of most use to newly established democracies, which have the greatest interest in further sta-
bilizing the domestic political status quo against nondemocratic threats.”). 
33  See David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1277 (2008); Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 985 
(2009). 
34  One notable exception in the literature that explores the role of partisan preferences in shaping the 
modern free trade regime is Michael A. Bailey et al., The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: 
Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade, 49 WORLD POL. 309 (1997), which argues that the Reci-
procal Trade Agreement of 1934 allowed congressional Democrats to satisfy the preferences of reluctant 
free traders within their party by coupling reductions in U.S. tariffs with the reduction in foreign tariffs.  
But this account also emphasizes how the institutional preferences of the President and Congress diverge 
on free trade because of the size of their constituencies.  See id. at 326.  As discussed later in this Ar-
ticle, however, whether such institutional divergence exists systematically is contested.  See infra notes 
165–72 and accompanying text. 
35  See Gowa, supra note 4, at 307–08.  However, there has been a long political science tradition 
that explores how political parties have adapted to the forces of economic globalization.  See, e.g., 
GEOFFREY GARETT, PARTISAN POLITICS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998).  But this literature does not 
necessarily examine whether parties embrace global institutions or international law for instrumental 
objectives.  
36  See Gowa, supra note 4, at 307 (observing that her results “are consistent with the existence of a 
tacit partisan truce, a self-enforcing agreement between the parties to abstain from using force abroad to 
prosecute political battles at home”). 
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disagreements one observes in the domestic policy realm.37  More recently, 
a relatively small number of international relations scholars have started to 
acknowledge the role of partisan groups in influencing both international 
cooperation and foreign military engagements.38  For instance, scholars like 
Helen Milner and Benjamin Judkins have shown empirically that left-
leaning parties tend to exhibit weaker support for free trade policies than 
their right-leaning counterparts.39  This new literature has observed that the 
domestic redistributive politics of international legal regimes do not always 
fit squarely within traditional interest group accounts.40  But this literature 
has not provided a coherent theoretical account of when and how political 
parties are likely to use international law instrumentally. 
A key insight of this new wave of constituency-driven accounts is that 
parties are not simply passive receptacles for the preferences of dominant 
interest groups.  First, the assumption that political parties have a primary 
interest in securing power suggests that there will often be a conflict be-
tween a party’s office-seeking and an interest group’s policy-seeking objec-
tives.41  Second, as some commentators have observed, it is perhaps better 
to think of parties as loyal agents for different societal principals who usual-
ly have conflicting or inconsistent preferences.42  In this framework, interest 
 
37  See, e.g., James M. McCormick & Eugene R. Wittkopf, Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideol-
ogy in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947–1988, 52 J. POL. 1077, 1097–98 (1990); 
James M. McCormick et al., Politics and Bipartisanship at the Water’s Edge: A Note on Bush and Clin-
ton, 30 POLITY 133, 146 (1997); Mark Souva & David Rohde, Elite Opinion Differences and Partisan-
ship in Congressional Foreign Policy, 1975–1996, 60 POL. RES. Q. 113, 119–21 (2007). 
38  For instance, in one influential study that responds to Gowa’s water’s edge thesis with respect to 
conflict initiation, Howell and Pevehouse show that the strength of the president’s party in Congress was 
positively related to the decision to engage in conflict up until 1973, when the War Powers Act was 
enacted.  See William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force, 
59 INT’L ORG. 209, 228 (2005).  Kenneth Anderson has also emphasized the role that international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) play in framing international policy debates, including those that 
have obvious ideological implications.  See Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American 
Foreign Policy: Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International Nongo-
vernmental Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371 (2001). 
39  See Joseph M. Grieco et al., When Preferences and Commitments Collide: The Effect of Relative 
Partisan Shifts on International Treaty Compliance, 63 INT’L ORG. 341, 342–43 (2009) (“[O]ther things 
being equal, a leftward shift in a government’s partisan placement is likely to result in a set of official 
policy views that are less hospitable to an open foreign exchange market, notwithstanding international 
legal commitments on this matter that were made by a previous government.”); Milner & Judkins, supra 
note 26, at 96. 
40  See Milner & Judkins, supra note 26, at 98101 (discussing the interest group account of trade 
policy preferences and contrasting it with an account that emphasizes partisan factors).  
41  See Thomas L. Brunell, The Relationship Between Political Parties and Interest Groups: Ex-
plaining Patterns of PAC Contributions to Candidates for Congress, 58 POL. RES. Q. 681 (2005) (dis-
cussing how interest groups often fund candidates from both parties to maximize their preferred policy 
outcomes). 
42  See, e.g., David H. Bearce, Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Out-
comes, 57 INT’L ORG. 373, 403–04 (2003) (applying the party as agent framework with respect to ex-
change rate stability).  
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groups—or societal principals—are more likely to lobby successfully for 
their preferred policy goals when their favored partisan agents are in pow-
er.43  Thus, for instance, contrary to the typical pluralist account, which fo-
cuses largely on the relative resources of competing interest groups to 
explain the demand for policy, labor groups seeking more protectionist pol-
icies may find themselves largely out of luck when a right-leaning govern-
ment is in power regardless of the level of resources deployed by such labor 
groups.  Correspondingly, export-oriented groups seeking greater market 
access may find their ability to influence international trade policy con-
strained under left-leaning governments.  Of course, political parties may 
sometimes go against the grain and seek to curry favor with interest groups 
that are not part of their core support network, but this phenomenon is suf-
ficiently uncommon that it may be colloquially associated with the so-
called “Nixon Goes to China” effect.44 
Third, and relatedly, voters often associate parties with specific ideo-
logical positions or issues, giving parties little flexibility to change their 
platforms to suit the policy preferences of certain interest groups without 
simultaneously sacrificing their political brand and credibility.  Politicians 
who stray away from long-held partisan positions may incur significant 
costs from their core constituencies.45  More broadly, as some commentators 
have observed, parties generally develop reputations for addressing certain 
issues better than others and have an incentive to emphasize those issues on 
which they have an electoral advantage.46  Thus, rather than compete ac-
cording to a spatial model of voting where each party stakes out different 
positions on the same issue,47 parties tend to own issues and then often try 
to compete by convincing voters that their issues are the most important.48  
As one commentator famously put it, “[P]arties do not debate positions on a 
single issue, but try instead to make end runs around each other on different 
issues.”49  For instance, in the United States, Democrats have cultivated a 
better reputation for handling social welfare and health issues, whereas Re-
publicans seem to have an electoral advantage in national security, drugs, 
 
43  See id. at 374–75.   
44  For an insightful discussion of this effect, in which left-leaning politicians have an incentive to 
pursue right-leaning goals and vice versa, see Robert E. Goodin, Voting Through the Looking Glass, 
77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 420 (1983). 
45  See M. Daniel Bernhardt & Daniel E. Ingberman, Candidate Reputations and the ‘Incumbency 
Effect,’ 27 J. PUB. ECON. 47, 59 (1985). 
46  Eric Belanger & Bonnie M. Meguid, Issue Salience, Issue Ownership, and Issue-Based Vote 
Choice, 27 ELECTORAL STUD. 477, 478 (2008); John R. Petrocik et al., Issue Ownership and Presiden-
tial Campaigning, 1952–2000, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 599, 601–02 (2003). 
47  Cf. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (discussing a partisan 
competition model). 
48  See Petrocik et al., supra note 46, at 599–601. 
49  William H. Riker, Introduction to AGENDA FORMATION 1, 4 (William H. Riker ed., 1993). 
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and crime.50  Generally, the core issues owned by each party tend to remain 
relatively stable over time.51  Trespassing on another party’s issue, while not 
uncommon, tends to be fraught with significant political risks.52  Thus, for 
instance, the Republican Party may not appear very credible if it announces 
that it will aggressively pursue a prolabor or prorights agenda because long-
standing issue associations are likely going to trump the self-serving state-
ments of elected officials.  
The implications of partisan issue ownership for the choice of interna-
tional legal commitments are significant.  The electoral benefits that politi-
cians receive from issue ownership are usually a function of both the 
saliency of those issues and the opportunities for addressing them.  For in-
stance, international commitments or norms can be used to raise the sa-
lience of an issue before a domestic audience.53  In this picture, politicians 
will seek to make the international concerns associated with the issues they 
own “the programmatic meaning of the election and the criteria by which 
voters make their choice.”54  If a party’s favored issue becomes enshrined in 
an international legal commitment or norm, it increases the likelihood that 
such an issue will remain part of the political agenda across multiple elec-
toral periods.  
The next Part builds upon these latter constituency-driven accounts and 
sketches how certain domestic structural factors in the U.S. political system 
might encourage partisan elites to use international agreements to overcome 
domestic barriers to their ideological and electoral objectives.  In particular, 
when the ideological or material preferences are aligned between certain 
powerful partisan elites and those of foreign states or interpreters of interna-
tional law, these elites may seek to use international law to entrench their 
preferred policies against a potentially hostile future government. 
 
50  See Petrocik et al., supra note 46, at 60809.  
51  See id. at 603 (“Constituency pressures within and between the parties, constant party rhetoric, 
and recurring policy initiatives reinforce issue reputations and keep them intact over long periods of 
time.”). 
52  See Helmut Norpoth & Bruce Buchanan, Wanted: The Education President: Issue Trespassing by 
Political Candidates, 56 PUB. OPINION Q. 87, 98 (1992) (arguing that an issue-trespassing strategy “runs 
the risk of raising issues where familiar party images strongly favor the opposing party.  At best, voters 
may simply ignore the issue; at worst, they may vote for the opponent.”). 
53  See Andrew P. Cortell & James W. Davis, Jr., Understanding the Domestic Impact of Interna-
tional Norms: A Research Agenda, 2 INT’L STUD. REV. 65, 86 (2000) (“[T]he effects of an international 
norm cannot be understood independent of the norm’s salience in the domestic political discourse.”).  
Goodman and Jinks have also suggested that the exclusion of a state from an international legal regime 
can further be used to promote issue salience among certain domestic constituencies.  See Goodman & 
Jinks, supra note 19, at 66667.  To some extent, politicians do not necessarily have complete control 
over the saliency of their issues; on the contrary, exogenous events such as an attack by foreign adversa-
ries or changes in global economic conditions may elevate or erode the salience of a party’s issues in 
unanticipated ways. 
54  John R. Petrocik, Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study, 40 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 825, 828 (1996) (emphasis omitted). 
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II. THE PARTISAN LOGIC OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PREFERENCES 
A. The Theoretical Foundation 
The notion that partisan struggles influence the domestic demand for 
international law relies on theories that emphasize the instrumental origins 
of institutions.  According to such theories, most political institutions are 
“not best explained as a Pareto-superior response to collective goals or ben-
efits but, rather, as a by-product of conflicts over distributional gains.”55  
Anticipating this dynamic, politicians will choose institutional arrange-
ments with an eye to the likely policy and electoral outcomes that will re-
sult.56  In the context of international law, this means that partisan elites 
may have an incentive to strategically expand the geographical scope of po-
litical conflict across borders if they believe it will isolate the domestic po-
litical opposition and enhance the influence of foreign actors with whom 
they share similar political objectives.57   
Some important implications flow from this basic insight.  First, parti-
san entrenchment through international law is likely going to be most useful 
to a governing party when it faces significant domestic hurdles to its policy 
and electoral agenda.  In a democratic system with multiple veto points, in-
cumbent regimes that are incapable of influencing policy outcomes directly 
against a recalcitrant and powerful domestic opposition may resort to inter-
 
55  JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 19 (1992) (emphasis omitted).  
56  The instrumental use of institutions is a very familiar theme in the judicial politics literature.  See, 
e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1045, 1066–68 (2001); John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 41 (2002); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use Courts to Advance Their Agendas: 
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002); see also Karen J. 
Alter, The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash, 54 INT’L ORG. 
489, 496 (2000) (observing that litigants and interest groups may use the EU legal system to promote 
their preferred policy objectives at the national level); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 
Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29 (2004) (dis-
cussing Supreme Court intervention in democratic-institutional design).  For a discussion of how politi-
cal actors try to exercise control over courts across different countries, including the transitional regimes 
in Eastern Europe, see Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and 
Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2001), which develops 
a model that explores the interaction between politicians and courts in Russia, and Gretchen Helmke, 
The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court–Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and De-
mocracy, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 291 (2002). 
57  The notion that governments may strategically seek to pursue their policy objectives at different 
levels of governance is quite common in the political science literature that explores partisan preferences 
for policymaking at the state versus national level.  See Donald P. Haider-Markel, Policy Diffusion as a 
Geographical Expansion of the Scope of Political Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage Bans in the 1990s, 1 ST. 
POL. & POL’Y Q. 5, 5 (2001) (“[W]hen a coalition loses in one political arena, it may try to alter the bal-
ance of forces by raising the issue in another, perhaps more favorable, venue.”); see also Jason Sorens, 
The Partisan Logic of Decentralization in Europe, 19 REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 255 (2009) (suggesting 
that partisan preferences for decentralization often turn on whether the party is more electorally success-
ful at regional rather than national politics). 
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national agreements or institutions to implement their preferred policy 
goals.  Such a strategy is more likely when the domestic opposition is able 
to use other domestic institutions or structures to thwart significant policy 
initiatives by the governing party even when the opposition may be in a mi-
nority in both the executive and legislative branches.  For instance, in a fe-
deralist structure where the opposition has obtained political authority in 
certain states, the governing party may opt to use international law to side-
step federalist barriers to conventional legislation.  Conversely, a party that 
stands to lose when a specific policy is addressed at the international level 
may prefer to have the locus of decisionmaking moved to the local or state 
level.  Furthermore, in the context where specific political parties exhibit 
fluctuating policy preferences over time, elected leaders may also decide to 
use international law to lock in policy objectives as a hedge against an in-
creasingly insecure and unpredictable domestic policy arena. 
Second, international commitments may not only be used to elevate an 
incumbent government’s favored partisan issue but also to constrain the 
ability of the opposition to promote its favored issues.  In other words, ef-
fective institutional entrenchment of a policy (or ideological) preference 
may not only have the effect of insulating that policy issue in the future 
from the vagaries of electoral politics but may also have the effect of freez-
ing out issues in which the political opposition has an electoral advantage.58  
Voters tend to judge politicians as a bundle of issue possibilities.  Where it 
is unlikely that a politician can act on an issue either because of legal or in-
stitutional constraints, then the rational voter will very likely discount the 
relevance of that issue at the ballot box.  Thus, all else being equal, we 
would expect politicians to prefer international commitments (or other insti-
tutional arrangements) that increase the possibilities for locking in those is-
sues in which they have an electoral advantage and international 
commitments that constrain the possibilities for carrying out issues that fa-
vor the opposition.59  
But certain preconditions have to be in place to make partisan entren-
chment through international law appealing to the governing party.  First, 
international commitments will tend to favor those political parties that are 
 
58  For instance, political scientists have long claimed that strategic policy entrenchment was a key 
feature of the New Deal programs.  “[T]he goal of progressive politics [during the New Deal],” Steven 
Teles argues, “was ‘depoliticization,’ in the sense that it sought to remove from political contention the 
fundamental normative choices in politics, emancipating professionals to initiate policies to further those 
choices, and foreclose their reconsideration.”  Steven M. Teles, Conservative Mobilization Against En-
trenched Liberalism, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND 
THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 160, 162 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007).   
59  For instance, in the United States, we may expect the Democratic Party—and left-leaning partisan 
elites—to be more receptive to international commitments that expand the possibilities of dealing with 
civil rights, labor rights, and environmental concerns.  Conversely, we would expect the Republican Par-
ty to be more invested in using international commitments to expand the possibilities of dealing with 
international trade and property rights—issues in which they usually have an electoral advantage. 
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in a position to find agreeable or friendly transnational partners in either the 
institutions that interpret or enforce international law or among the govern-
ing coalitions (or ruling elites) of other states.  As Moravcsik has observed, 
transnational alliances may emerge when “domestic groups in more than 
one country agree to cooperate or exchange political assets in order to pre-
vail over other domestic groups or over governmental opposition.”60  In the 
United States, for instance, foreign pressure on human and social rights is-
sues may tend to benefit certain left-leaning groups because of a conver-
gence of interests between these groups and European elites who are more 
sympathetic to the welfare state and a progressive vision of social rights 
than the median American voter.61  To the extent that groups across the po-
litical spectrum are not disadvantaged in building transnational coalitions 
for their causes, however, one may expect that one-sided partisan resistance 
to such coalitions will be blunted.   
Second, to make it worthwhile for politicians to use an international 
legal commitment or regime, the relevant political and institutional condi-
tions underlying it must be stable and resistant to change.  Observing that 
politicians may occasionally use international commitments for partisan 
purposes tells us very little about its success as a strategy.  International 
commitments may not be of much instrumental value if they can be undone 
once the political opposition comes into power.  Thus, the salient question 
is whether international commitments are likely to remain binding across 
multiple electoral cycles regardless of whether the commitment is the result 
of a negotiated international agreement or customary international law.  
To be sure, political entrenchment by partisan actors, whereby a cur-
rent governing coalition attempts to embed its preferences in ways that con-
strain its successors, is a fairly common strategy in domestic politics.62  Just 
as legislators use super-statutes or other legislative tactics to entrench their 
preferences,63 they can use international law as a useful alternative vehicle 
for entrenching policy goals when uncertain about the commitment of the 
political opposition to these goals.  This strategic use of international law 
may even be more effective than domestic entrenchment strategies.  Recent-
 
60  Moravcsik, supra note 11, at 32. 
61  See infra notes 14346 and accompanying text.  
62  The strategic entrenchment of partisan goals through a sympathetic judiciary is a common theme 
in the judicial politics literature.  See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 56, at 1066–68; Gillman, supra 
note 56, at 521 (describing nineteenth-century efforts by the Republican Party to entrench its policy 
goals through courts); Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1532 (2007) (“Partisan entrenchments, in which an outgoing coalition at-
tempts to constitutionalize a favored policy to bind the hands of successors, are routine.”). 
63  For analyses of legislative entrenchment, whereby one legislature tries to bind successor legisla-
tures, compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1665, 1670–73 (2002), which defends legislative entrenchment, with John O. McGinnis & Michael 
B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 
419–22 (2003), which criticizes legislative entrenchment.  For a discussion of super-statutes, see Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001). 
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ly, Rachel Brewster has argued convincingly that reversing international 
agreements may actually be harder than changing domestic statutes because 
of the additional costs imposed by an international audience when there is a 
breach.64   
In practice, however, governments have often defied international legal 
commitments that are inconsistent with their partisan preferences.  To start, 
politicians may formally exit treaties or other international commitments 
that previous regimes had entered into.65  Of course, one may plausibly ar-
gue that governments that exit treaties or fail to comply with their interna-
tional commitments on one issue may suffer reputational costs in other 
issue areas.66  But assuming that a government’s partisan orientation and 
policy preferences are likely to be known in advance to an international au-
dience, it is hard to see how that government’s failure to comply with an in-
ternational agreement that is inconsistent with its preferences would also 
affect its reputation and willingness to comply with those agreements that 
do align with its preferences.67  Simply put, in a fragmented system of inter-
national law, there is very little reason to think that a reputation for com-
pliance would be fungible across multiple issue areas.68   
More broadly, formally withdrawing from or defying an international 
commitment does not necessarily exhaust the options available to the party 
that disfavors such a commitment.  Many international commitments de-
pend on domestic state actors to secure implementation of the commit-
ment’s provisions.  In such circumstances, one may reasonably conjecture 
that there will be variations in the level of implementation of such a com-
 
64  Brewster, supra note 17, at 512–13; see also Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 734–35 (“[I]nternational 
obligation is not the only means of entrenching policies.  However, international law has significant ad-
vantages relative to legislative supermajorities, an independent judiciary, or specialized independent 
regulatory agencies. . . .  International legal actors, by contrast, are more difficult to control.  Interna-
tional organizations and courts are beyond the control of any single country, even the most powerful.”). 
65  See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1581–82 (2005).  Yet, as Edward 
Swaine observes, efforts to unsign treaties negotiated by a previous regime can be a source of controver-
sy, even when such treaties have not been formally ratified.  See Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 2061 (2003). 
66  For two helpful commentaries of the role of reputation in international law compliance, see 
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 71–117 
(2008), and MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT 
ACROSS THREE CENTURIES (2007).  
67  Rachel Brewster makes a similar point in another context: 
A violation in one issue area, however, need not lead the audience to conclude that a violation in 
any other area is more likely.  In fact, the audience may well think that the government is more 
likely to comply with [international law] in other issue areas, depending on the cause of non-
compliance.  For instance, the election of a Green Party to power might indicate that the new gov-
ernment is more likely to abide by environmental treaties but less likely to abide by a trade agree-
ment that restricts environmental regulation. 
Rachel Brewster, The Limits of Reputation on Compliance, 1 INT’L THEORY 323, 329 (2009). 
68  See id. at 328–29 (criticizing the notion that reputational sanctions are effective across multiple 
issue areas); George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95 (2002) (same). 
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mitment depending on the preferences of the governing party.69  For in-
stance, during the 1990s, U.K. Prime Minister John Major ignored an ad-
verse European Court of Justice ruling on EU Working Time mandates that 
conflicted with his conservative government’s views on labor policies.70  
More broadly, the available evidence regarding cross-national implementa-
tion of EU policy directives seems to support the conjecture of partisan-
inspired implementation.  In one study, Oliver Treib showed that the suc-
cess or failure in implementing EU Directives across four countries turned 
largely on whether they corresponded with the partisan objectives of the 
government in power.71  Indeed, this study also showed that when the go-
verning party favored any EU Directive for political reasons, it actually 
tended to overimplement the Directive’s provisions.72 
B. Conditions Likely to Influence the Electoral Sustainability of 
International Law 
What, then, are the conditions under which partisan international legal 
commitments are likely to be sustainable across multiple electoral cycles?  
Admittedly, it is difficult to answer such a question with any empirical cer-
tainty, but one may reasonably speculate that the extended stability of such 
partisan commitments most likely depends on two factors: the availability 
of side benefits to the opposition party and the level of fragmentation within 
the domestic political institutions.   
1. Prospects for Cross-Partisan Issue Bundling.—The electoral sus-
tainability of an international legal commitment is more likely if it also in-
cludes some benefits to coalitions within the nonenacting political 
opposition.  Thus, an agreement is likely to have greater staying power if it 
is negotiated and ratified behind a thick veil of ignorance.73  Such a com-
mitment need not include partisan benefits that are symmetric across the 
enacting incumbent government and the political opposition; on the con-
trary, it may work as long as the opposition is conflicted enough that it is 
unable to marshal the will to repeal or refuse implementation of the interna-
 
69  For a theoretical model that supports the notion that compliance should be contingent on the pre-
ferences of competing domestic constituents, see Xinyuan Dai, The Conditional Nature of Democratic 
Compliance, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 690 (2006).  See also Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and 
Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 127 (2010) (proposing a social scientific theory of compliance with international law that fo-
cuses attention on domestic politics). 
70  Oliver Treib, EU Governance, Misfit, and the Partisan Logic of Domestic Adaptation: An Actor-
Centered Perspective on the Transposition of EU Directives 10 (Mar. 27–29, 2003) (published in Ger-
man as 44 VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 506 (2003)), available at http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/
TreibPartisanLogic2003.pdf. 
71  Id. at 823. 
72  See id. at 1620. 
73  For a concise discussion of the role of the veil of ignorance in institutional design, see Adrian 
Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399 (2001). 
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tional commitment once it obtains power.  Simply put, partisan entrench-
ment is both rational and plausible for an incumbent government if its pre-
ferences in favor of the commitment are quite intense, but intraparty 
conflicts within the political opposition leave the opposition ambivalent 
about the international commitment.  Thus, insofar as a forward-looking 
enacting coalition wants to increase the durability of an international 
agreement that advances its partisan objectives, it has an incentive to in-
clude provisions in the agreement that offer side payments to a potentially 
hostile successor government.  Although the political opposition often may 
appear to be losers because certain politically unfavorable issues are embo-
died in an international legal commitment, they may not be losers in the 
larger picture because issues that favor them are included in the package.74  
Bundling, in effect, may help diminish the political stakes in adopting an in-
ternational commitment and ensure that the commitment serves the parties’ 
joint interests, at least partially.  
2. The Fragmentation of Domestic Institutions.—Second, the ability 
of partisan elites to entrench their preferences in international commitments 
will depend significantly on the level of fragmentation within domestic po-
litical institutions.  All else being equal, the use of international legal com-
mitments for instrumental purposes will remain less likely when restrictive 
domestic institutions make it too costly to adopt or implement such com-
mitments.  Thus, partisans or domestic groups who stand to lose from inter-
national law have an incentive to use the existence of multiple veto points 
or fragmented domestic institutions to their advantage whereas proponents 
will seek to overcome these institutional barriers through the use of courts 
or other autonomous bureaucrats.  In other words, parties are likely to treat 
domestic institutions as a set of obstacles to be exploited or to be maneu-
vered around in pursuit of their partisan political objectives in the interna-
tional arena. 
To be clear, the strategic use of policy veto points for instrumental po-
litical goals is a common theme in the political science literature.75  These 
accounts, however, do not make explicit the ways through which partisan 
actors may use veto points to achieve their policy goals.  For the most part, 
the social science commentary tends to treat the existence of veto points as 
highly inflexible external constraints on policy actors.76  According to such 
accounts, the more veto players there are, the more difficult it is for domes-
 
74  For an excellent discussion of how institutions can facilitate compromise among those with com-
peting policy preferences by bundling together multiple policy issues in one package, see Levinson, su-
pra note 7, at 34. 
75  See Witold J. Henisz & Edward D. Mansfield, Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of 
Commercial Openness, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 189, 19192 (2006); Andrew Moravcsik, Why Is U.S. Human 
Rights Policy So Unilateralist?, in MULTILATERALISM & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AMBIVALENT 
ENGAGEMENT 345, 358 (Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman eds., 2002). 
76  See Henisz & Mansfield, supra note 75, at 189–92. 
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tic groups to change the policy status quo.77  Thus, the feasible range of pol-
icy proposals will be necessarily dictated by the preferences of all veto 
players.   
In real life, however, the story is much more complicated.  In many 
circumstances, the actual scope of legal authority of veto players may be 
ambiguous or ill-defined.  Determined partisans, who are aware of this legal 
landscape, may very well exploit this ambiguity to their electoral or policy 
advantage.  In the United States, for instance, it is somewhat unclear from a 
constitutional perspective whether international agreements have to be ap-
proved exclusively through the Treaty Clause, which requires the approval 
of two-thirds of the Senate, or through a congressional–executive agree-
ment, which only requires a simple majority of both houses of Congress.78  
Moreover, another recurring but unresolved question is the extent to which 
treaties should be presumptively treated as self-executing in the absence of 
subsequent legislation or explicit treaty language.79  Finally, another recur-
ring question in the literature is the extent to which nonratified international 
agreements or state practices may be used as evidence of customary interna-
tional law in the United States and the extent to which customary interna-
tional law may be federal law that binds the constituent states under the 
Supremacy Clause.80   
 
77  See id. at 190. 
78  See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 807–
13 (1995) (arguing that treaties and congressional–executive agreements are interchangeable); Laurence 
H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional In-
terpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 124978 (1995) (taking the position that international obligations 
with such an extensive scope have to be adopted as treaties).  For a more detailed analysis of these de-
bates in the literature, see Steve Charnovitz, Using Framework Statutes to Facilitate U.S. Treaty Mak-
ing, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 696, 702–04 (2004). 
79  See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 371–80 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the debates regarding treaty self-execution); Carlos Ma-
nuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of 
Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008) (arguing for a presumption in favor of self-execution).  Recent-
ly, in Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify when courts should treat treaties as self-
executing.  See 552 U.S. 491, 50423 (2008).  But commentators are still conflicted as to whether the 
Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement has helped resolve the underlying doctrinal confusion regarding 
self-executing treaties.  See John T. Parry, Response, Rewriting the Roberts Court’s Law of Treaties, 
88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 65, 69 (2010), http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol88/pdf/
88TexasLRevSeeAlso65.pdf (“[T]he Court’s actual reasoning strongly hints at a presumption against 
self-execution (even as it stops short of actually proclaiming one) . . . .”).  But see Curtis A. Bradley, In-
tent, Presumptions, and Non-self-executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 541 (2008) (“To the ex-
tent that the Court applied a presumption in Medellín, it was a simply a presumption against giving 
direct effect to decisions of the International Court of Justice . . . .”); Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part 
of Our Law,” 88 TEX. L. REV. 91, 118 (2009) (arguing that interpreting the Medellín decision as creating 
a presumption against self-execution would be wrong).   
80  See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (criticizing the modern position 
that customary international law has the status of federal common law).  But see Ryan Goodman & De-
rek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 
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Of course, there is a rich literature in the legal academy that debates 
the scope of these constitutional constraints.81  This Article does not attempt 
to join these normative debates but instead suggests that the resultant con-
stitutional ambiguity is fraught with different strategic considerations for 
domestic groups seeking to support or oppose international legal commit-
ments.  For instance, the ambiguities in the American federal system pro-
vide the opposition with the opportunity to exercise considerable political 
power over regions and then use that power to resist the adoption or imple-
mentation of unfavorable international legal commitments.  Similarly, pro-
ponents of international legal commitments in the United States may 
attempt to use courts to overcome the obstacles created by domestic frag-
mentation of power.  One plausible aspect of this latter strategy, which has 
attracted significant controversy in the literature, involves the possibility of 
using federal courts to enforce customary international norms against the 
states without prior statutory or treaty authority.82  In this picture, since cus-
tomary international law itself does not necessarily require formal legisla-
tive action by the political branches, a partisan-friendly court acting as an 
autonomous policy leader may be able to use customary international law to 
overcome some of the substantive barriers imposed by federalism and the 
separation of powers. 
But aside from federalism and separation of powers considerations, 
presidents also have considerable latitude in interpreting the scope of U.S. 
obligations under existing international legal commitments.  In other words, 
within the matrix of domestic political institutions in the United States, fed-
eral courts have routinely deferred to the president’s view as to what specif-
ic treaties or customary international law obligations require.83  In this 
                                                                                                                           
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997) (defending the modern position); Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (same); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense 
and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997) (same); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary Internation-
al Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997) (same).  Of course, there are some 
commentators who stake out a middle position between these two camps.  See Michael D. Ramsey, In-
ternational Law as Non-preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 555 (2002) (staking out the view 
that that federal courts should treat international law not as federal common law but as “general” com-
mon law that would not be preemptive or jurisdictional); Ernest A. Young, Sorting out the Debate over 
Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002). 
81  For examples of this literature, see supra notes 7980.  
82  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 80, at 81921.  For a very critical view of judicially en-
forced customary international law against state actors, see John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should In-
ternational Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007). 
83  There is a rich debate in the literature about to what extent, if any, courts should defer to the pres-
ident’s interpretation of international law.  Nonetheless, as a descriptive matter, most commentators 
agree that courts do accord substantial deference.  See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and For-
eign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 661 (2000); see also Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: 
The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1752–58 (2007) (ex-
amining the practical impact of the deference doctrine);  Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregard-
ing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1236–38 (2007) (examining the contexts in which 
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picture, presidents have significant leeway to interpret an international legal 
commitment expansively if it promotes their partisan preferences or to in-
terpret it very narrowly otherwise.   
III. ILLUSTRATIONS 
Does categorizing a democratic government by its partisan orientation 
predict its attitude towards specific international law commitments?  To an-
swer that question, and to compare the electoral sustainability of specific 
kinds of international commitments, I examine Republican and Democratic 
responses to the negotiation and ratification of human rights treaties in the 
1950s and the ratification of NAFTA in 1993.   
Admittedly, given the limited scope of these two case studies, the most 
I can hope to achieve is to show that partisan motivations are a plausible 
factor in the decision of state actors to either support or oppose international 
law across a wide range of issue areas.  Moreover, the illustrations below 
have an obvious parochial slant in that they focus exclusively on the parti-
san dynamics surrounding the adoption and enforcement of international 
law in the United States.  There is reason to think, however, that there is 
some empirical support for similar strategic political behavior outside the 
United States, especially with respect to ongoing debates surrounding Eu-
ropean integration.84  
A. Opposing Perceived Partisan Entrenchment: The Postwar Human 
Rights Treaty Controversies 
The controversy surrounding both the Bricker Amendment and the 
postwar effort to ratify human rights agreements in the United States is fa-
miliar to many international law scholars and is recounted in detail else-
where.85  In brief, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, President 
                                                                                                                           
courts will defer to Executive Branch determinations of foreign policy); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 179, 194–99 (2006) (offering rebuttal to Justice Stevens’s opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld); 
Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 980 (2004) (exploring the insti-
tutional competency of courts with respect to allocations of foreign affairs power); Eric A. Posner & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1175–78 & nn.10–17 
(2007) (examining the Executive’s power relative to judicial international relations doctrines); David 
Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 
62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 497–99 (2007) (contrasting the deference to the Executive Branch in 
the decades before Hamdan v. Rumsfeld with the zero-deference approach of courts in the early nine-
teenth century). 
84  On this point, it is worth noting that a small but growing number of comparative law scholars 
have started to study the role of partisanship in the implementation and enforcement of EU legal com-
mitments by member states.  See Liesbeth Hooghe et al., Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on 
European Integration?, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 965 (2002); Treib, supra note 70. 
85  See generally DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF 
EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988) (describing the Bricker Amendment controversy).  For a 
complementary analysis that discusses the Bricker Amendment in terms of the United States’ uneasy 
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Truman was facing mounting political pressure to be more proactive on a 
range of social policy and civil rights issues.86  In this political climate, con-
servatives feared that the United States’ growing involvement in the United 
Nations would have an adverse effect on federal and state control over so-
cial and economic policy.87  Moreover, in a growing number of civil rights 
claims coming before federal and state courts during this period, plaintiffs 
often invoked the U.N. Charter, and some courts appeared to be sympathet-
ic to this legal strategy.88  President Truman subsequently negotiated two 
U.N. human rights treaties: the Genocide Convention and the Convention 
on the Political Rights of Women.  Underscoring the political contentious-
ness underlying both of these treaties, neither was ratified during the Tru-
man Administration; indeed, the Genocide Convention was only ratified by 
the Senate in 1986—forty years after it was first signed.89  In any event, 
skepticism regarding these human rights treaties became a key plank of the 
1952 and 1956 Republican Party platforms.  “We shall see to it,” the 1952 
                                                                                                                           
relationship with human rights treaties, see Curtis A. Bradley, The United States and Human Rights 
Treaties: Race Relations, the Cold War, and Constitutionalism, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 321, 33538 
(2010). 
86  As one commentator observes, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt understood that civil rights could 
prove explosive for the Democrats, and he succeeded in keeping them off the table.  By 1948, however, 
Truman could no longer ignore the growing presence of black in northern cities to whom he had to ap-
peal electorally.”  Andrea Louise Campbell, Parties, Electoral Participation, and Shifting Voting Blocs, 
in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF 
CONSERVATISM, supra note 58, at 68, 94. 
87  See Arthur H. Dean, The Bricker Amendment and Authority over Foreign Affairs, 32 FOREIGN 
AFF. 1, 1619 (1953).  
88  See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649–50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring) (“There are 
additional reasons now why that law stands as an obstacle to the free accomplishment of our policy in 
the international field.  One of these reasons is that we have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with 
the United Nations to ‘promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’  How can this nation 
be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens 
on account of race are permitted to be enforced?” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
U.N. Charter arts. 55–56)).  For a detailed discussion of how courts and litigants have approached U.N. 
human rights agreements, see Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States 
Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984). 
89  In his narrative account of his role in supporting the Bricker Amendment, former American Bar 
Association President Frank Holman provides some insight as to why the Geneva Convention was not 
ratified under President Truman.  See FRANK E. HOLMAN, STORY OF THE “BRICKER” AMENDMENT 6 
(1954) (“It was not ratified—due to the studies and the opposition of the American Bar Association.”); 
see also NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF 
OPPOSITION 3763 (1990) (discussing the intense and politicized ratification debates over the Genocide 
Convention).  The Senate consented to the U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention in 1986 but 
conditioned such ratification on the passage of implementing legislation by Congress.  See S. Res. 347, 
99th Cong. (1986) (enacted).  Congress eventually passed implementing legislation in 1988, see Geno-
cide Convention Implementation Act (Proxmire Act) of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606, 102 Stat. 3045 
(1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091–1093 (2006)), and the Convention was ratified by President Rea-
gan on November 14, 1988, see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 372 (2010) (entered into 
force for the United States on February 23, 1989).  
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platform declared, “that no treaty or agreement with other countries de-
prives our citizens of the rights guaranteed them by the Federal Constitu-
tion.”90  Leading the Republican charge against the ratification of various 
human rights treaties was Senator Bricker of Ohio, who sought to introduce 
a constitutional amendment that would include language stating that “trea-
ties shall only be implemented by legislation ‘which would be valid in the 
absence of treaty.’”91 
The legal background to the Bricker Amendment movement involved 
the 1920 Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. Holland, which held that a 
treaty could empower Congress to pass legislation that, in the absence of 
the treaty, would be reserved to the exclusive power of the states.92  In the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, fears mounted that the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion might provide an institutional loophole for bypassing existing constitu-
tional barriers for enacting certain forms of domestic legislation.93  
However, Senator Bricker’s effort to amend the Constitution eventually fiz-
zled after Republican President Eisenhower came to power.  His Secretary 
of State, John Foster Dulles, made it clear that the Administration did not 
intend to support ratification of any of the U.N. human rights treaties that 
were at the core of the controversy.94  In the end, although Senator Bricker’s 
effort narrowly failed to muster the requisite supermajority in the Senate 
vote required for the amendment to pass the first constitutional hurdle, it set 
the stage for the prolonged political resistance to Senate ratification of hu-
man rights treaties in the United States that various commentators claim 
continues to this day.95 
Much of the scholarship on the Bricker Amendment and the Senate’s 
postwar opposition to human rights treaties has tended to focus narrowly on 
 
90  Republican Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1952, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Ju-
ly 7, 1952), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25837. The 1956 platform uses very 
similar language: “We shall see to it that no treaty or agreement with other countries attempts to deprive 
our citizens of the rights guaranteed them by the Federal Constitution.”  Republican Party Platforms: 
Republican Party Platform of 1956, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 20, 1956), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25838.  
91  HOLMAN, supra note 89, at 27. 
92  252 U.S. 416, 434–35 (1920). 
93  See HOLMAN, supra note 89, at 8–20. 
94  See id. at 36.  More specifically, Secretary Dulles stated during congressional hearings: 
[W]hile we shall not withhold our counsel from those who seek to draft a treaty or covenant on 
human rights, we do not ourselves look upon a treaty as the means which we would now select as 
the proper and most effective way to spread throughout the world the goals of human liberty to 
which this Nation has been dedicated since its inception.  We therefore do not intend to become a 
party to any such covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration by the Senate. 
Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 825 (1953) [hereinafter 1953 Hearings]. 
95  See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 (1995); Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human 
Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 
309 (1988). 
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special interest politics, especially the role of Southern segregationists and 
allied conservative groups.96  For instance, in their detailed account of the 
legacy of the Bricker Amendment for the modern human rights movement, 
Kaufman and Whiteman stress the racially motivated concerns of conserva-
tive groups who “took very seriously any discussion of federal action to 
dismantle segregation within the states.”97  Although these interest-group-
capture accounts have proved quite useful in explaining particular aspects 
of postwar human rights treaty skepticism, they are nonetheless incomplete.   
First, the notion that conflicts over human rights treaties in the United 
States can be best explained by narrow special interest capture rests on 
questionable premises.  At bottom, the politics underlying international hu-
man rights treaty ratification are not best characterized as diffuse costs 
borne by the majority with concentrated benefits accruing largely to con-
servative special interest groups.98  On the contrary, there is usually intense 
lobbying by ideological groups on both sides of the issue,99 making depen-
dence on interest-group-capture theories particularly problematic.  More 
broadly, there is no reason to suppose that conservative interest groups ei-
ther wielded more political clout or had more intense preferences than pro-
gressive interest groups on human rights or civil rights issues in the postwar 
decades.  For instance, progressive ideological groups had achieved varying 
degrees of success in pushing civil rights and social policy reform through 
either domestic legislation or public impact litigation from the 1950s to the 
mid-1960s and had managed to do so by overcoming many of the same ob-
stacles supposedly imposed by federalism and separation of powers in the 
human rights treaty context.100  As discussed below, the postwar dynamic 
 
96  See Henkin, supra note 95, at 348 (“The campaign for the Bricker Amendment apparently 
represented a move by anti-civil-rights and ‘states’ rights’ forces to seek to preventin particu-
larbringing an end to racial discrimination and segregation by international treaty.”); Kaufman & 
Whiteman, supra note 95, at 310; Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, in 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (describing con-
servative opposition to human rights treaties in the United States); see also Kaufman, supra note 89, at 
1216.  To be sure, Kaufman also emphasizes Cold War concerns by conservative groups about the 
spread of socialist and communist influences, but she finds a link between these Cold War factors and 
conservative opposition to civil rights.  See Kaufman, supra note 89, at 1416.  
97  Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 95, at 310.   
98  In the public choice literature, interest group capture entails the notion that small and concen-
trated interest groups with a higher stake in policy outcomes will be more effective in attaining benefits 
in the area of legislation than large and dispersed groups like the public at large.  See Richard A. Posner, 
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 
(1982).  Thus, this literature tends to emphasize the disjuncture between the preferences of a special in-
terest group and the general public, rather than conflict between constituencies or interest groups affi-
liated with the two major political parties. 
99  Cf. Glendon Austin Schubert, Jr., Politics and the Constitution: The Bricker Amendment During 
1953, 16 J. POL. 257, 27172 (1954) (describing the conservative interest groups in favor of the various 
Bricker Amendment resolutions and the liberal groups in opposition).  
100  For an overview of some of the literature on how progressive politicians were able to overcome 
the obstacles imposed by federalism, see Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Politi-
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with respect to human rights treaties is better understood in terms of compe-
tition between partisan interest groups rather than capture by any specific 
set of interest groups.101 
Second, the strong emphasis on Southern segregationist influences in 
the interest group account of the Bricker Amendment is somewhat mislead-
ing.  To be sure, various Southern senators (and interest groups) were deep-
ly skeptical about the proliferation of human rights treaties in the postwar 
era, but it is difficult to argue that opposition to civil rights was the driving 
force behind the Bricker Amendment movement.  Take, for instance, the 
partisan and geographical distribution of the Senate sponsors of the 
amendment.  The key sponsor, Senator Bricker, was a Midwestern politi-
cian and the 1944 Republican vice-presidential candidate who had been a 
longtime foe of President Roosevelt’s New Deal initiatives102 but who oth-
erwise exhibited little or no interest in the postwar civil rights movement.103  
Another sponsor, Republican Senator Robert Taft, also from Ohio and an 
opponent of the New Deal, happened to be a strong supporter of civil rights.  
In 1946, Senator Taft had sought to propose legislation that would effec-
tively abolish racial discrimination in the workplace—nearly twenty years 
before the Civil Rights Act of 1964.104  More broadly, nineteen out of twen-
ty-four Midwestern senators initially supported the proposed amendment in 
early 1953.105  From a partisan stance, the 1953 version of the amendment 
had sixty-four sponsors in the Senate, which included forty-five out of for-
ty-eight Republican senators, but only thirteen of the nineteen Democratic 
sponsors in the Senate were from the South.106  At bottom, the distribution 
of support and opposition to the various versions of the amendment tran-
scended traditional geographical or ideological lines on issues like segrega-
tion,107 with an overwhelming majority of Republican senators from all 
regions in the country in favor and a significant majority of Democratic 
                                                                                                                           
cal Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 583 (2005).   
101  See infra notes 10711 and accompanying text. 
102  See RICHARD O. DAVIES, DEFENDER OF THE OLD GUARD: JOHN BRICKER AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS, at x–xi, 3233 (1993). 
103  See id. at 193. 
104  See David Freeman Engstrom, The Taft Proposal of 1946 & The (Non-) Making of American 
Fair Employment Law, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 181, 182 (2006).  
105  See Philip A. Grant, The Bricker Amendment Controversy, 15 PRES. STUD. Q. 572, 577 (1985). 
But as Grant observes, two of these Midwestern pro-amendment senators eventually switched their posi-
tions, and in the final roll call votes Midwestern senators voted 17–6 in favor of the amendment.  See id.  
106  See Schubert, supra note 99, at 266. 
107  Indeed, given that the Bricker Amendment movement took place years before the partisan rea-
lignment of the 1960s in which Southern whites started to flee the Democratic Party, it seems odd to cast 
what was ostensibly a Republican proposal as motivated primarily by segregationist impulses.  As 
Engstrom makes clear in his analysis of Senator Taft’s role in the civil rights agenda, the partisan loyalty 
of African-Americans was still up for grabs in the years after World War II.  See Engstrom, supra note 
104, at 186, 189–90. 
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senators against.108  Moreover, the array of interest groups in support of the 
amendment was quite broad, ranging from industry professional groups like 
the American Medical Association, the United States Chamber of Com-
merce, and the National Economic Council to ideological or patriotic 
groups like the Daughters of the American Revolution.109 
We get more traction if we evaluate the controversy surrounding the 
postwar efforts to ratify human rights treaties not simply as a disagreement 
about isolationism versus internationalism, or of special interest politics 
over desegregation, but as an exercise in distributive partisan politics.  In 
this framework, although both Democratic and Republican Senators in the 
postwar era might have been subject to lobbying by a wide array of eco-
nomic and ideological groups on human rights issues, they were responsive 
to very different groups when they had to choose to support or oppose the 
ratification of human rights treaties.  Politicians from both parties likely 
sought a very broad base of support for their policies to be elected, but it 
was the support from the elected official’s core constituency (or interest 
groups) that was often most crucial.110  Thus, the orientation of any party 
towards human rights agreements during the postwar era was likely to re-
flect the preferences of its key supporters. 
Applying this partisan logic to the immediate postwar era, we can bet-
ter understand the impetus for the Bricker Amendment movement and the 
failure of the postwar efforts to ratify U.N. human rights treaties.  In the late 
1940s, partisan polarization over the New Deal programs had become quite 
intense.  Among President Truman’s supporters, there was a growing con-
cern that Republicans, who had won decisive congressional majorities in 
the 1946 midterm elections, would muster enough political support to roll 
back the core pillars of the New Deal if they also won the White House in 
1948.111  In his 1948 State of the Union address, Truman went on the offen-
sive and pushed for a wide-ranging liberal agenda that would substantially 
cement and expand the New Deal; in sum, he promised not only to establish 
massive new national health insurance and affordable housing programs but 
 
108  See Schubert, supra note 99, at 266. The ideological spectrum of the amendment’s sponsors in 
the Senate not only encompassed Southern Dixiecrats but also included isolationists from both sides of 
the aisle and some Eisenhower Republicans who normally followed President Eisenhower’s lead on for-
eign policy issues but refused to do so on this issue.  For a brief description of the political spectrum of 
the amendment’s sponsors in the Senate, see TANANBAUM, supra note 85, at 15763.  
109  For a list of interest groups supporting and opposing the amendment, see Schubert, supra note 
99, at 271 nn.5253. 
110  As Bueno de Mesquita and others have observed, politicians have an incentive to focus their ef-
forts on the subset of the electorate that makes up their winning coalition, and in democracies, that win-
ning coalition is not necessarily a majority of the voters but rather a subset that is comprised of the 
politician’s core partisan supporters.  See BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL 
SURVIVAL 27787 (2003); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Demo-
crats Divide on Religious Values, 120 Q.J. ECON. 1283 (2005); Gábor Virág, Playing for Your Own Au-
dience: Extremism in Two-Party Elections, 10 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 891 (2008).  
111  DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 585–86 (1992). 
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also to almost double the minimum wage (from forty cents to seventy-five 
cents an hour) and provide more support for education and farmers.112 
In this contentious political climate, certain groups became concerned 
that Truman might use the various U.N. Human Rights Conventions to push 
for positive economic rights and civil rights objectives that his Administra-
tion could not otherwise accomplish directly through legislation or unilater-
al executive action.113  Bricker crowed, for instance, that the U.N. Covenant 
for Human Rights “was an ingenious mechanism designed to stifle all criti-
cism of the so-called Fair Deal.”114  And these concerns were not necessari-
ly without foundation.  As Elizabeth Borgwardt points out in her exhaustive 
study on the effect of the New Deal on globalization, human rights in the 
postwar era often served as shorthand for an idea that also embraced Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s vision of the Four Freedoms, which included “basic con-
ceptions of economic justice.”115  With the support of progressive groups, 
the Committee for Civil Rights established by President Truman had se-
riously flirted with the idea of using U.N. human rights treaties as a tool for 
bypassing domestic obstacles to social and economic reform (such as fede-
ralism and separation of powers).116  However, this strategy faced one sig-
nificant obstacle: many of the relevant U.N. human rights covenants that 
directly addressed civil rights issues—such as the proposed U.N. Conven-
tion on Human Rights and the Genocide Convention—had not been ratified 
by the U.S. Senate.  However, the U.N. Charter had been ratified as a treaty, 
and at least two of its articles seemed relevant to the civil rights cause.117  
The Truman Committee viewed these Charter provisions as a plausible al-
ternative legal vehicle for advancing progressive civil rights policies, and 
 
112  Id. at 586. 
113  See Duane A. Tananbaum, The Bricker Amendment Controversy: Its Origins and Eisenhower’s 
Role, 9 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 73, 8081 (1985). 
114  TANANBAUM, supra note 85, at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
115  ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: AMERICA’S VISION FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS 285 (2005).  The Four Freedoms included freedom of speech and expression, freedom to wor-
ship God, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.  Id. at 20–21.  
116  See KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103–04 (2004). 
117  The relevant articles were Articles 55 and 56.  Article 55 of the Charter reads in relevant part: 
 With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights . . . the United Nations shall promote: 
  a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress living, full employment, and conditions of social progress and development;  
  b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and interna-
tional cultural and educational cooperation; and  
  c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
U.N. Charter art. 55.  Article 56 provides: “All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate 
action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”  
Id. art. 56. 
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human rights activists and legal academics provided fodder for the notion 
that the U.N. Charter was legally binding in the United States as a matter of 
domestic law.118  Moreover, the favorable political context created by the 
Truman Administration meant that courts could act with considerable lati-
tude, and many cited the U.N. Charter favorably in the early postwar civil 
rights cases.119   
Against this background, the ratification of the U.N. human rights trea-
ties emerged as both a partisan and a sectional cleavage issue for two key 
reasons.  First, Republican senators overwhelmingly disfavored ratification, 
because none of their party’s core constituencies stood to gain much from 
ratifying the treaties.  These treaties did not offer much in the way of cross-
partisan bundling opportunities because most (if not all) of the obvious dis-
tributive benefits favored groups aligned with the Democratic Party.  For 
instance, the key U.N. human rights covenants included positive economic 
and social rights, such as access to decent living conditions, affordable 
housing, education, income, and employment—objectives that, although fa-
vored by many groups on the left, were largely anathema to core consti-
tuencies favoring the Republican Party.120  More broadly, the intrapartisan 
cleavages that sometimes divide right-leaning ideological and business 
groups were noticeably absent.  Indeed, opposition to the human rights trea-
ties cut across almost all of the key interest groups that were traditionally 
hostile to the Roosevelt–Truman New Deal programs, including patriot 
 
118  See Lockwood, supra note 88, at 916 (surveying efforts by interest groups to apply the U.N. 
Charter provisions in state and federal courts in the postwar era); Paul Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer and 
United Nations Law, 34 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (1948) (“[T]he United Nations Charter is now not only part 
of our Constitution, but by our constitutional act we are part of the United Nations.  In so far as the 
Charter’s provisions justly apply, we are not free to choose in a hit-or-miss way: we are morally and le-
gally bound to give them all full effect all the time.” (footnote omitted)).  For a more general discussion 
of the effort by civil rights groups to appeal to the United Nations, see MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM 
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 183–84 
(2004). 
119  See Lockwood, supra note 88.  
120  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring the right to a sufficient standard of living, including the right to health care).  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was submitted for signature years later, 
also protected a range of positive rights.  See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (Dec. 
16, 1966) (recognizing rights to health care, education, and a living wage).  The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights provides the broadest statement yet of a right to health care: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. (2) The steps to be taken by the States 
Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those ne-
cessary for: (a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for 
the healthy development of the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and in-
dustrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medi-
cal attention in the event of sickness. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 12, U.N. 
Doc. A/6316, at 51, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966) (signed by the United States on Oct. 5, 1977). 
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groups like the Daughters of the American Revolution and industry groups 
like the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, and 
the United States Chamber of Commerce.121  If there was a single ideologi-
cal or philosophical agenda that united all these various right-leaning con-
stituencies, it was probably antipathy to New Deal progressivism; indeed, 
these groups ranged from traditional isolationists who disapproved of any 
meddling by international organizations to Republican internationalists who 
were suspicious that these U.N. treaties could be used as vehicles to pro-
mote socialist ideals and Soviet propaganda.122  For the most part, however, 
the industry and professional groups who supported the amendment were 
concerned that U.N. human rights treaties would be used to entrench more 
expansive labor regulations and implement socialized health care.123   
Second, and more important, the postwar U.N. human rights treaties 
split the Democratic Party’s core electoral coalition between Northern lib-
erals and Southern whites who feared such treaties could be used as a ploy 
to push for domestic civil rights reform.  In the late 1940s, strategic elector-
al considerations had meshed with ideological leanings to convince Truman 
and other progressive Democrats that the aggressive promotion of civil 
rights for African-Americans would be a smart political idea.  Since the 
Great Depression, African-Americans, who were once a loyal constituency 
of the party of Lincoln, had been drifting steadily to the Democratic Party.  
By the 1946 midterm elections, however, the Democratic Party’s hold on 
 
121  See Schubert, supra note 99, at 271 n.53.  
122  The Republican fears about Soviet influence at the United Nations proved not to be entirely un-
justified—recent evidence suggests that the Soviet delegation played a key role in drafting portions of 
the U.N. Declaration and considered the Declaration a vehicle for promoting its vision of positive social 
rights.  See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, 
DRAFTING, AND INTENT 93–96 (1999) (discussing the influence of Communist states in drafting the 
nondiscrimination provision in the Declaration); see also id. at 157–81 (discussing the socialist and 
Communist influence in drafting the work-related rights provisions).  Moreover, the final draft of the 
Covenant on Human Rights specifically excluded any provision for the protection of private property—
an apparent response to the Soviet delegation’s strenuous objections to including such a provision.  The 
Chairman of the Human Rights Commission at the eighth session, Charles Malik of Lebanon, com-
plained of disproportionate Soviet influence on a proposed International Convention on Human Rights: 
I think a study of our proceedings will reveal that the amendments we adopted to the old texts un-
der examination responded for the most part more to Soviet than to Western promptings.  For the 
second year an unsuccessful attempt was made to include an article on the right to own proper-
ty. . . .  The concept of property and its ownership is at the heart of the great ideological conflict of 
the present day.  It was not only the Communist representatives who riddled this concept with 
questions and doubts, a goodly portion of the non-Communist world had itself succumbed to these 
doubts.  
HOLMAN, supra note 89, at 72 (alteration in original).  
123  See Tananbaum, supra note 113, at 80 (“The American medical profession feared that ‘under the 
present law it would entirely possible for socialized medicine . . . to be foisted upon the American 
people through ratification by the Senate of treaty commitments made in the United Nations organiza-
tion.’” (quoting COLUMBUS (OHIO) ACAD. MED. BULL. (Mar. 1953), at 41)); see also Editorials and 
Comments, Dangers of Treaty Law Still Exist, 152 JAMA 823, 823 (1953) (describing concerns of the 
American Medical Association with human rights treaties).  
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the African-American vote was becoming increasingly tenuous as Republi-
cans made significant inroads among African-American strongholds in the 
Northeast.124  Seeking to reverse this trend, James Rowe, an attorney and 
leading Democratic operative, drafted a report that was subsequently 
adopted as a crucial guide for Truman’s 1948 election campaign.  “[T]he 
northern Negro voter,” the memo concluded, “today holds the balance of 
the power in Presidential elections for the simple arithmetical reason that 
the Negroes not only vote in a bloc but are geographically concentrated in 
the pivotal, large and closely contested electoral states such as New York, 
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan.”125  Ironically, in what would 
eventually prove to be a grave political miscalculation, the memo assumed 
that the loyalty of Southern Democrats could be taken for granted even if 
civil rights reform became a key part of Truman’s electoral agenda.126   
In any event, Southern Democrats feared that Truman would attempt to 
use U.N. treaties to shore up his support among both Northern liberals and a 
more politically assertive African-American base.127  Moreover, civil rights 
groups in the United States were increasingly turning to the United Nations 
as a possible institutional venue for seeking redress against discriminatory 
Jim Crow policies.128  For instance, the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP) had formally petitioned the United 
Nations in 1947 to complain about the treatment of African-Americans.  
The organization claimed that having “failed to find relief from oppression 
through constitutional appeal, [we] find ourselves forced to bring this vital 
issue . . . to the attention of this historic body.”129   
All these developments helped trigger the backlash by a coalition of 
Republicans and Southern Democrats in the Senate who subsequently 
joined forces to support Senator Bricker’s effort to amend the treaty power.  
But what united this coalition was hardly shared animosity towards the 
cause of African-Americans.  Indeed, as some commentators have ob-
served, certain Republican officials had sought to court the African-
American vote in the late 1940s but balked at embracing civil rights legisla-
tion in the workplace because Republican-leaning business constituencies 
were generally opposed to expansion of regulations that would interfere 
 
124  See GARY A. DONALDSON, TRUMAN DEFEATS DEWEY 11 (1999).  
125  Memorandum from James Rowe for Budget Bureau Dir. James Webb (Sept. 18, 1947), availa-
ble at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/case/3pt/rowe.html. 
126  “As always,” the memo concluded, “the South can be considered safely Democratic.  And in 
formulating national policy it can be safely ignored.”  Id. 
127  See supra notes 11319, 12224 and accompanying text.  
128  See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 43–46 (2000). 
129  Id. at 44 (quoting NAACP, AN APPEAL TO THE WORLD (W.E. Burghardt Du Bois ed., 1947)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
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with private commercial interests, including antidiscrimination regulation.130  
In any event, facing an increasingly split Democratic coalition, Truman 
eventually chose the option of party unity, forgoing a legislative remedy to 
push his civil rights agenda and instead concentrating on pushing reform 
through the courts.131  The human rights treaty controversy nonetheless be-
came part of a larger rift within the Democratic Party that drove many 
prominent Southern politicians who were part of Roosevelt’s coalition to 
support Eisenhower in the 1952 elections.132  
To be sure, the hostility that conservative Senators held towards inter-
national commitments that might lock in a progressive policy agenda was 
understandable.  That is not the end of the story, however.  Why, one might 
ask, did the Truman Administration not anticipate this unfavorable political 
dynamic and seek modifications to the U.N. Human Rights Conventions 
that would stymie the mobilization of opposing, conservative forces?  In 
other words, why did Truman not attempt to co-opt the political opposition 
composed of Republicans and Southern Democrats through side payments 
within the framework of these draft U.N. Human Rights Conventions?  
The short answer is that the Truman Administration tried but could not 
get the various other state signatories on board.  More specifically, Eleanor 
Roosevelt, Truman’s chief delegate to the United Nations and the first 
Chair of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, proposed two different mod-
ifications to the treaty language that would have made the proposed U.N. 
Draft Covenant on Human Rights less burdensome to the domestic political 
opposition.133  First, she proposed that the Covenant be non-self-executing 
and exclude any language on social and economic rights.134  Second, she at-
tempted to include a “states’ rights” provision within the Covenant that 
guaranteed that none of its substantive provisions would apply directly to 
the states (or federal subdivisions).135  The other signatories of the proposed 
Covenant rejected it even though they were aware that rejection would 
make it unlikely that the Truman Administration would gain the legislative 
support necessary for ratification.136  In sum, the various draft U.N. cove-
 
130  See DONALDSON, supra note 124, at 11–12 (observing that the Republican Speaker of the House 
had told an African-American audience that Republican support of fair employment practice legislation 
would alienate Midwestern and New England industrialists who would likely stop contributing to the 
Republican Party).  
131  See Whittington, supra note 100, at 592–93. 
132  See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN 
AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–1955, at 212–16 (2003). 
133  The Draft U.N. Convention on Human Rights was the first effort to implement the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 
AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 195 (2001). 
134  See ANDERSON, supra note 132, at 200; GLENDON, supra note 133, at 196. 
135  See ANDERSON, supra note 132, at 4–5, 200.  
136  In the end, rather than one Human Rights Convention, two separate Conventions were drafted to 
implement the Declaration—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Social, Cultural, and Economic Rights.  See GLENDON, supra note 133, at 202.  
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nants did not leave any of the domestic opposition in the United States—
Republicans and Southern Democrats—much reason to believe that they 
would ever benefit from these covenants although they could reasonably 
expect that their political adversaries would. 
Nonetheless, the Bricker Amendment movement still presents a puzzle: 
given how unfavorable the postwar political climate was to the Senate rati-
fication of human rights treaties, why did Senator Bricker and his legisla-
tive allies persist in their quest to pass a constitutional amendment even 
after the Republicans won the White House in 1952?  After all, even though 
Eisenhower had disfavored the Bricker Amendment as an interference with 
the Executive Branch’s authority in foreign affairs, he shared his co-
partisans’ antipathy to human rights treaties, which he demonstrated by 
committing not to negotiate any more such treaties and by appointing a 
well-known treaty skeptic to replace Eleanor Roosevelt as delegate to the 
United Nations.137  One plausible answer is that the postwar Republican lea-
dership had succumbed to both isolationist and Red Scare impulses.138  But 
this account suffers from one significant weakness.  Although Senator 
Bricker frequently invoked strident nationalist and anti-Communist rhetor-
ic, he was hardly a diehard isolationist.  Indeed, Bricker had voted for the 
United States participation in NATO in 1949 and for the Marshall Plan in 
1947.139  Also, a relatively stable bipartisan consensus had emerged on for-
eign policy matters between the Roosevelt and Eisenhower Administrations 
that formed the basis of U.S. support for postwar multilateral institutions.140  
Thus, the Bricker Amendment was somewhat of an anomaly; it represented 
one of very few key foreign policy issues in the early 1950s where there 
was a gap between the views of the Republican and Democratic elites.141  
 
137  After seeking Eleanor Roosevelt’s resignation from the delegation to the United Nations, Eisen-
hower appointed as a delegate James Byrnes, Truman’s former Secretary of State and a committed 
Southern segregationist, who was a vocal critic of Truman’s civil rights and internationalist policies.  
See ANDERSON, supra note 132, at 215, 241–42.  Another controversial Eisenhower appointment to the 
U.S. delegation to the United Nations was Mary Pillsbury Lord—a flour mills heiress.  See id. at 236–
37.  
138  See, e.g., JUSTUS D. DOENECKE, NOT TO THE SWIFT: THE OLD ISOLATIONISTS IN THE COLD WAR 
ERA 236–37 (1979). 
139  TANANBAUM, supra note 85, at 23.  Moreover, Wildavsky’s famous “two presidents” thesis, 
which argued that presidents are more likely to gain congressional support for their foreign policy initia-
tives than their domestic ones, was based largely on political branch interactions in the 1950s.  Aaron 
Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies, TRANS–ACTION, Dec. 1966, at 7.  For a critical overview of whether 
the two presidents thesis applies in the modern era, see Richard Fleisher et al., The Demise of the Two 
Presidencies, 28 AM. POL. Q. 3 (2000).   
140  McCormick & Wittkopf, supra note 37, at 1078–79.  
141  See OLE R. HOLSTI, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 175 (rev. ed. 2007) 
(“[T]he occasional Gallup special surveys of Who’s Who in America biographees suggest some partisan 
differences on such issues as the Bricker Amendment to restrict executive treaty-making powers and on 
the admission of communist China to the United Nations.”). 
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 A more promising explanation of the Republican strategy to seek a 
constitutional amendment under Eisenhower’s Administration is that they 
were hoping to achieve two distinct but related objectives.  First, they 
hoped to dissuade federal and state judges who might otherwise be sympa-
thetic to progressive causes from relying on the already ratified U.N. Char-
ter or other ratified treaties as a source of binding domestic law.142  Second, 
they wanted to forestall any future progressive administration from achiev-
ing its domestic policy objectives through the treaty power.  Thus, the 
Bricker Amendment movement represented a concerted campaign by Re-
publican-leaning business and ideological constituencies (and Southern 
Democrats) to confine future political battles over social and economic pol-
icy to venues where they were more likely to prevail against their progres-
sive political adversaries.  They attempted to do so by increasing 
constitutional barriers to the President’s authority to make binding treaties 
with foreign countries, especially if there was a risk that such treaties would 
be self-executing.  
The postwar conservative coalition’s view that creating additional veto 
points over the treaty power would hurt the ability of progressives to ad-
vance their causes was not without foundation.  Given the burgeoning polit-
ical salience of the civil rights movement and the alignment of that 
movement’s goals with those of labor groups and other New Deal consti-
tuencies, it was safe to assume that political and judicial efforts pushing for 
desegregation would be around in the future.  Liberal Democrats in the 
United States and key European allies began to converge both on core so-
cial issues like civil rights and also on an expansive vision of the welfare 
state.  For instance, beyond the Soviet Union’s seemingly self-serving rhe-
toric condemning racial discrimination in the United States, various demo-
cratic European allies criticized the civil rights situation in the South.143  
Moreover, in postwar Europe, elites sympathized with the notion of protect-
ing positive economic rights either through human rights treaties or national 
constitutions.144  In sum, the pool of potential stakeholders in the proposed 
 
142  As Clarence Manion, Dean of Notre Dame Law School, clarified in his testimony in support of 
the amendment: 
[W]e are told that the amendment may have been needed in the past, but both patriotism and sanity 
have now been restored to our diplomatic counsels and no Constitution-destroying treaties will he-
reafter be negotiated or ratified.  We all can earnestly hope and believe that this prediction is cor-
rect.  However, testimony now in this record . . . discloses that more than 50 dangerous treaties are 
presently awaiting ratification . . . .  Against these pending treaties we still have a defense in the 
process of ratification by the Senate.  My concern is with the continuing court constructions of 
treaties and executive agreements already ratified, accepted and now binding upon us all as the su-
preme law of the land. 
1953 Hearings, supra note 94, at 814. 
143  See ANDERSON, supra note 132, at 108–11.  For a more general view of how Europeans reacted 
towards American treatment of African-Americans, see DUDZIAK, supra note 128, at 34–36.  
144  See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 
525–26 (1992) (discussing “the attitudes of the post-World War II European constitution-makers who 
supplemented traditional negative liberties with certain affirmative social and economic rights or obliga-
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U.N. human rights agreements was significant and growing, which meant 
that it might eventually be strong enough to weaken the resolve of conserv-
ative forces opposed to progressive social and economic reform.  
In the modern era, the issues surrounding the Bricker Amendment con-
tinue to play out in debates regarding ratification of the U.N. Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the U.N. Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).145  For in-
stance, the 2008 Democratic platform endorsed the ratification of CEDAW 
as well as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.146  By 
contrast, the 2008 Republican platform vowed to reject the ratification of 
both CEDAW and CRC: 
Because the UN has no mandate to promote radical social engineering, any ef-
fort to address global social problems must respect the fundamental institutions 
of marriage and family. . . .  We reject any treaty or agreement that would vi-
olate those values.  That includes the UN convention on women’s 
rights . . . and the UN convention on the rights of the child.147 
For Republicans, these treaties intruded on two issues that are likely to ap-
peal to that party’s conservative base: family privacy and reproductive free-
dom.  In some sense, opposition to these two U.N. Conventions accentuates 
the Republican issue ownership over “family values” in a manner that not 
only is likely to mobilize the party’s traditional base148 but also may appeal 
                                                                                                                           
tions”); Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional So-
cial and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521 (2010) (observing the pervasive pattern of protection 
of positive social and economic rights in postwar constitutions).  Prominent conservative legal scholars 
and political scientists have expressed concern that human rights treaties might be susceptible to capture 
by narrow left-leaning groups aligned with European elites and autocratic states.  See John R. Bolton, 
Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205 (2000); McGinnis & Somin, su-
pra note 82; Jeremy Rabkin, Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-member States?, 1 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 273, 27576 (2000). 
145  See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S 3 (en-
tered into force May 3, 2008); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). 
146  See Democratic Party Platforms: 2008 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT 
(Aug. 25, 2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78283.  President Obama eventual-
ly signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2009.  See President Barack Ob-
ama, Remarks by the President on Signing of U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
Proclamation (July 24, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-
on-Rights-of-Persons-with-Disabilities-Proclamation-Signing. 
147  Republican Party Platforms: 2008 Republican Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 
1, 2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78545. 
148  See William Martin, The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy, 114 FOREIGN POL. 66, 
66–69 (1999). 
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to conservative Democratic voters concerned that dominant American cul-
tural values are under attack.149 
The institutional terrain for contemporary partisan battles over human 
rights treaties has shifted over the past fifty years.  For instance, partisan in-
terest groups rarely invoke the threat of a constitutional amendment to fo-
restall the ratification of an unfavorable human rights treaty, which may 
lend credence to the criticism that Senator Bricker’s effort to amend the 
Constitution was a form of institutional overkill.150  Instead, modern debates 
over human rights treaties tend to center around constitutional ambiguities, 
such as whether such treaties can ever be self-executing151 or whether fur-
ther legislative action is always required.152  But more broadly, even when 
human rights treaties are ratified by the Senate, they are invariably inun-
dated with reservations that foreclose direct enforcement of such treaties in 
domestic courts.153  Partisan groups on both sides of the issue very likely 
emerged from the Bricker Amendment controversy more circumspect about 
how to use institutional arrangements and legislation to advance their re-
spective agendas.  For instance, progressives probably realized that a friend-
ly federal judiciary interpreting a robust vision of the Fourteenth 
 
149  See DAVID C. LEEGE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: SOCIAL CHANGE AND 
VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES IN THE POST-NEW DEAL PERIOD 158–66 (2002).   
150  Cf. John B. Whitton & J. Edward Fowler, Bricker Amendment—Fallacies and Dangers, 48 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 23, 23–24 (1954) (“Though no past cases of the abuse of the treaty-making power are proved, 
and the possibility of Senate approval of any of the allegedly dangerous human rights treaties is admitted 
to be nil, the constitutional implications of those treaties are considered sufficient warning to justify an 
attempt to ‘close the barn door before the horse is stolen.’”). 
151  As discussed earlier, despite the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in Medellín, the con-
tours of the doctrine governing self-executing treaties still remain unclear.  See supra note 79 and ac-
companying text.  
152  See Henkin, supra note 95, at 341–43 (describing recent human rights treaties and discussing the 
Senate’s extensive use of reservations to convey its understanding that such treaties are not self-
executing); see also David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?: Equivalence, 
Duality, and Non-self-execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228 (2010) (arguing in favor of a broad notion of 
treaty non-self-execution); David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-self-
executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 139–42 (1999) (observing 
that the United States included declarations of non-self-execution in its instruments of ratification with 
respect to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the United Nations Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment); Lesley Wexler, Take the Long Way 
Home: Sub-federal Integration of Unratified and Non-self-executing Treaty Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 
2 (2006) (“Even when the United States does join multilateral environmental and human rights treaties, 
these treaties often languish in Congress without domestic implementing legislation.”). 
153  See Henkin, supra note 95, at 341–43.  For some of the debates regarding reservations to human 
rights treaties and their validity, see Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and 
State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 531 (2002), which suggests that reservations should be treated as se-
verable.  But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Con-
sent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 402 (2000) (arguing that reservations, understandings, and declarations to 
human rights treaties “reflect a sensible accommodation of competing domestic and international con-
siderations”).  
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Amendment was a better vehicle for entrenching domestic civil rights poli-
cy goals than U.N. international human rights agreements.154  On the other 
hand, right-leaning groups realized that they could effectively thwart the 
domestic enforcement of unfavorable human rights agreements without 
having to resort to proposals to amend the Constitution. 
In sum, although debates regarding human rights treaties and norms are 
often couched in high-minded or principled language, they often implicate 
more strategic partisan and electoral calculations.  With respect to the post-
war human rights treaty controversies, advocacy groups associated with 
both of the major political parties were seeking to expand or shrink the 
scope of political conflict over social and economic policy to venues in 
which they had an advantage.  Then, as now, these debates were often not 
over competing visions of American foreign policy but rather over the role 
such human rights treaties should play in increasingly polarizing domestic 
conflicts over cultural and social policy issues.155 
At bottom, human and social rights treaties may tend to influence the 
electoral opportunity structure in ways that favor one party over another.  
First, human rights policies might appeal directly to the needs of electorally 
relevant constituencies in one party.  When Truman first succeeded Frank-
lin Roosevelt, he might not have inherited a mandate to promote civil 
rights; by the end of his first term, though, he was facing mounting pressure 
by a well-organized African-American constituency to take a more aggres-
sive stance on desegregation.  Championing the progressive social policy 
goals contained in the various U.N. human rights agreements promised to 
solidify the support of a group that proved to be important to his electoral 
success in the 1948 presidential elections and to whom he would undoub-
tedly turn for support in 1952.  On the other hand, Truman’s stance alie-
nated the Southern Democrats, who subsequently became vital allies in a 
Republican-led backlash against the U.N. human rights movement.   
Second, human rights issues might tend to raise the profile of issues 
owned by one party.  In the United States, most of the issues covered by 
U.N. human rights treaties tend to be those in which Democrats are likely to 
have an electoral advantage, such as discrimination towards women and 
minority groups, rights of immigrants and refugees, and rights of criminal 
suspects.  Alternatively, these treaties tend to ignore or deemphasize issues 
on which Republicans have an electoral advantage over Democrats.  For 
example, one commentator has suggested that Americans and Europeans 
are “farther divided on the question of capital punishment than on any other 
 
154  See Whittington, supra note 100, at 591–93.  
155  See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 
402–03 (1998) (discussing how the proliferation of human rights treaties might affect state control over 
social issues); Moravcsik, supra note 96, at 147–50 (discussing ideological disagreements in the United 
States over human rights treaties). 
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morally significant question of government policy.”156  Ostensibly, the Eu-
ropean Union insists that capital punishment offends “human dignity” and 
that its abolition will lead to “the progressive development of human 
rights.”157  But such rhetoric obscures the reality that capital punishment has 
been a part of the electoral strategy of the Republican Party in the United 
States for the past four decades, and its abolition could undermine that par-
ty’s office-seeking objectives.158  The redistributive politics of capital pu-
nishment stem not only from the reality that core Republican constituencies 
tend to favor harsher criminal punishment but also from the fact that inde-
pendents and swing voters tend to trust Republican candidates to be tougher 
on crime than their Democratic counterparts.159  Republicans since the Nix-
on Administration have deliberately cultivated an anticrime image of which 
unwavering partisan support for capital punishment has been a key compo-
nent.160  To a significant degree, this strategy has worked.  According to 
some empirical studies, there is a strong positive relationship between Re-
publican Party strength and the legal existence of the death penalty.161  
Meanwhile, crime has continued to be one of the most electorally salient is-
sues in American politics.  As one commentator has observed, “[I]t would 
not be hyperbolic to conclude that crime has been the central theme in the 
rhetoric of American electoral politics and in the strategies of elected offi-
cials in the decades since 1968.”162   
Given these political dynamics, it is unsurprising that no modern hu-
man rights treaty has ever been ratified while Republicans held a majority 
in the U.S. Senate; indeed, as Moravcsik has observed, such treaties have 
only been ratified when the Democrats have held close to a supermajority in 
the Senate.163 
 
156  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 181 (2003).  
157  Death Has No Appeal, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/
death_has_no_appeal_en.htm (last visited June 26, 2011). 
158  See David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, Ideology, Social Threat, and the Death Sentence: 
Capital Sentences Across Time and Space, 83 SOC. FORCES 249, 257–58 (2004). 
159  See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW POLITICAL 
ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE 89 (1995) (“People who fear crime gravi-
tate to the Republicans and listen to the Republicans when they speak out on crime.”).  But cf. David B. 
Holian, He’s Stealing My Issues! Clinton’s Crime Rhetoric and the Dynamics of Issue Ownership, 
26 POL. BEHAV. 95 (2004) (footnote omitted) (suggesting that President Clinton successfully trespassed 
on the crime issue during the 1992 presidential campaign and was able to dilute part of the Republican 
ownership of the issue). 
160  See Jacobs & Carmichael, supra note 158, at 257–58.  
161  See David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the Death Penalty: A 
Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 109, 114–16 (2002). 
162  EVAN J. MANDERY, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A BALANCED EXAMINATION 645 (2005).   
163  See Moravcsik, supra note 96, at 184. 
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B. Promoting Intrapartisan Conflict within the Political Opposition: The 
Case of NAFTA   
At first blush, the passage of NAFTA in 1993 might seem like an odd 
illustration of how political parties use international law to secure electoral 
or ideological advantage.  After all, the prevailing account of international 
trade in the United States is one of well-organized and concentrated interest 
groups who exercise significant lobbying clout over a Congress that is in-
creasingly wedded to “special interests.”164  Downplaying any significant 
role for partisanship, this account suggests that protectionist groups dep-
loyed their privileged access to key congressional committees in the early 
part of the twentieth century to seek policies that raised trade barriers to 
dangerously high levels.  This strong pork-barrel dynamic, the story goes, 
eventually triggered the disastrous Smoot–Hawley Tariff legislation of the 
1930s, which in turn propelled Congress in 1934 to take measures to dele-
gate much of its international trade authority to the President.165  By turning 
over more power to a free-trade-oriented Executive Branch that was more 
accountable to a broader audience, Congress was able to forestall an in-
creasing spiral of protectionism and set the stage for the modern era of free 
trade.166  According to this account, the passage of NAFTA, like previous 
international trade agreements of the twentieth century, was simply another 
incident where a combination of institutional factors and favorable histori-
cal circumstances led to a triumph of public-regarding policies over special 
interest politics.167 
But recent scholarship has begun to question this long-standing institu-
tionalist narrative.  First, as a growing number of studies have shown, the 
 
164  See KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GLOBAL GAME: A NEW LOOK AT US 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING 818 (2001); I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 
1416 (4th ed. 2005); Michael A. Bailey et al., The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Poli-
tics, Coalitions, and International Trade, 49 WORLD POL. 309, 309 (1997); Susanne Lohmann & Sharyn 
O’Halloran, Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence, 48 INT’L ORG. 595, 596 
(1994); Karen E. Schnietz, The Institutional Foundation of U.S. Trade Policy: Revisiting Explanations 
for the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 12 J. POL’Y HIST. 417, 418–19 (2000).  
165  See DESTLER, supra note 164, at 1417 (arguing that members of Congress delegated authority 
in order to “protect[] themselves . . . from the direct, one-sided pressure from producer interests that had 
led them to make bad trade law”).  In 1934, Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
(RTAA), Pub. L. No. 73-316, § 350(a), 48 Stat. 943 (1934) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a) 
(2006)).  The RTAA authorized the President “[t]o enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign gov-
ernments . . . and . . . [t]o proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restric-
tions . . . to carry out any [such] trade agreement.” 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1)(A)(B).  
166  See, e.g., Bailey et al., supra note 164, at 326 (observing that presidents favored low tariffs be-
cause the president’s constituency is national while that of a member of Congress is local); Schnietz, 
supra note 164, at 429–32 (same). 
167  See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION 
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 22324 (1999) (arguing that 
delegation by Congress to the President makes trade agreements like NAFTA feasible); see also ROSS 
K. BAKER, HOUSE AND SENATE 225 (3d ed. 2001) (arguing that senators were more supportive of 
NAFTA than members of the House were because senators have larger constituencies). 
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notion that the President is consistently more free-trade-oriented than Con-
gress is suspect.  On the contrary, trade policies often seem to track partisan 
lines rather than the institutional preferences of the political branches.  For 
instance, prior to the 1950s, Republican politicians across both political 
branches favored more protectionist policies than Democrats168 whereas, in 
the modern era, the parties have largely switched positions, with the Repub-
licans becoming the party of free trade.169  Moreover, the broader claim that 
the President may be more responsive to a more nationalist (and thus less 
protectionist) constituency than Congress is undertheorized and lacks em-
pirical support.170  Second, the notion that Congress would attempt to re-
strict interest group pressures by delegating international trade authority to 
the President also seems difficult to reconcile with what we know about 
legislative behavior.  After all, Congress has not forsaken involvement in 
international trade politics; indeed, interest group lobbying before Congress 
on trade issues is still quite common.171  More broadly, if Congress were 
seeking to protect itself from the effects of special interest politics, why 
would it restrict its public-mindedness to international trade and not extend 
it to other areas where special interest lobbying is pervasive, such as tort 
reform, gun control, or health care reform?  Third, the notion that interna-
tional trade politics in Congress are best characterized as one-sided pork-
barrel lobbying in favor of higher trade barriers is misleading; on the con-
trary, there are well-organized interest groups both for and against reducing 
trade barriers, and the evidence does not suggest that protectionist groups 
are consistently more influential than export-oriented industry groups seek-
ing to lower trade barriers.172  
 
168  See Michael J. Hiscox, The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberali-
zation, 53 INT’L ORG. 669, 677 (1999) (“[T]he notion that any president, by dint of having a larger con-
stituency, must be less protectionist than the median member of Congress, is hopelessly ahistorical.”). 
169  See JAMES SHOCH, TRADING BLOWS: PARTY COMPETITION AND U.S. TRADE POLICY IN A 
GLOBALIZING ERA 4–6 (2001); see also Richard Sherman, Delegation, Ratification, and U.S. Trade Pol-
icy: Why Divided Government Causes Lower Tariffs, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 1171, 1178–82 (2002) (ar-
guing that in the postwar era Republican presidents tend to be more protectionist than Republican 
Congresses while Democratic presidents tend to be less protectionist than Democratic Congresses). 
170  See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 1217, 1231–32 (2006).  Moreover, the claim that politicians who are elected from a broader au-
dience are more likely to pursue free trade policies is also empirically unsupported.  See Sean D. Eh-
rlich, Constituency Size and Support for Trade Liberalization: An Analysis of Foreign Economic Policy 
Preferences in Congress, 5 FOREIGN POL’Y ANALYSIS 215 (2009) (finding no support for the constitu-
ency size or the assumption that presidents have more liberal trade policies); David Karol, Does Consti-
tuency Size Affect Elected Officials’ Trade Policy Preferences?, 69 J. POL. 483 (2007) (finding no 
empirical support for the notion that larger constituencies render elected officials less protectionist). 
171  See Nzelibe, supra note 170, at 1270–71. 
172  In hindsight, a more plausible account of Congress’s behavior in the wake of Smoot–Hawley 
was that it delegated international trade authority to the President because it sought to be more respon-
sive to groups seeking access to foreign markets but lacked the institutional tools to do so.  In other 
words, Congress sought to liberalize, but it could not do so on its own because the President had the ex-
clusive authority to negotiate the reduction of tariffs with other states.  See id. 
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In any event, a cursory review of the political dynamics preceding the 
passage of NAFTA in 1993 suggests that the quest for partisan advantage 
played a key role.  For Democrats seeking to take back the White House in 
1992, NAFTA exposed a potentially significant fault line within their core 
electoral coalition, dividing party centrists such as the moderate and busi-
ness-oriented Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) from the more tradi-
tional Democratic labor constituencies.173  To Clinton, a self-styled “New 
Democrat” who was himself a leader of the DLC, the question of a North 
American regional trade agreement that would include Mexico was poten-
tially a highly divisive issue that threatened to undermine the unity of the 
coalition he needed to gain victory in 1992.  As James Shoch shows in his 
extensive study of postwar U.S. trade policy, the fight against NAFTA was 
the most significant lobbying effort undertaken by organized labor since the 
1930s.174  For the most part, organized labor feared that the agreement 
would precipitate significant capital flight to Mexico and depress blue-
collar wages.175  Thus, unlike the politics surrounding the negotiation of the 
Uruguay Round in 1994, which did not provoke significant resistance by 
labor groups in the United States, NAFTA involved the broad liberalization 
of investment flows.176  On the other hand, however, centrist Democrats 
were courting American multinational companies that were hoping to use 
the agreement to take advantage of Mexico’s vast labor pool.177  Faced with 
the possibility of a deeply divided coalition within the Democratic Party, 
Clinton had an incentive to avoid taking sides during his campaign on an is-
sue that was likely to polarize his base.178   
Against this background, Republicans had an incentive to lift NAFTA 
high on the 1992 campaign agenda partly to exploit any resultant infighting 
among Democrats to their electoral advantage.  Initially, the Republicans 
had made the negotiation of NAFTA a key part of their electoral platform, 
hoping that focusing on its implications would shore up their support 
among Hispanic voters and business groups in Southwest states that might 
prove to be pivotal in a close election.179  More importantly, however, the 
Republicans started to realize that international trade would be a wedge is-
 
173  See SHOCH, supra note 169, at 147, 180–83; L. Ronald Scheman, A Pact That Divides Demo-
crats, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1992, at A31. 
174  See SHOCH, supra note 169, at 180. 
175  See id. at 193. 
176  See id. at 146, 19293. 
177  See id. at 14546, 183; Sandra Masur, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Why It’s in 
the Interest of U.S. Business, 26 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 98, 101 (1991) (describing ways that NAFTA 
will benefit American corporations). 
178  For instance, when Clinton campaigned in the Midwest, then a union stronghold, he expressed 
doubt as to whether he would be willing to seek legislative ratification of a NAFTA agreement signed 
by President Bush.  See SHOCH, supra note 169, at 158. 
179  See id. at 158–59. 
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sue for the Democrats that year.180  After all, the Democratic primaries had 
revealed very strong cleavages between two different coalitions in the party, 
one that was personified by the stridently anti-NAFTA position of Senator 
Tom Harkin of Iowa and the other by the more moderate and business-
friendly Clinton.181  Later that fall, President Bush turned up the heat and 
accused his opponent Clinton of waffling on international trade.182  Indeed, 
Clinton’s ambivalence over NAFTA became a key talking point for the Re-
publicans as to why the Democratic candidate could not be trusted as a de-
cisive leader.183  Initially, it looked like the Republican divide-and-rule 
strategy was working as Clinton refused to take a clear position on the issue 
throughout the summer.184  He eventually relented a month before the elec-
tion and said he would accept the signed NAFTA agreement, but only if the 
final agreement included side agreements on labor standards.185   
So why did the Republicans push so hard to make NAFTA a signifi-
cant part of the agenda in an election year?  In the end, it is difficult to con-
clude that NAFTA was an issue on which Republicans believed that they 
could pick up many swing voters at the expense of Democrats since the 
passage of NAFTA was hardly a popular issue in the economic climate of 
late 1992.186  Moreover, it is not clear that the Republicans thought they 
could prevail on the NAFTA question if they had won the 1992 presidential 
election because it was unlikely that they would pick up enough votes from 
House Democrats to ensure ratification.187  More plausibly, the Republicans 
 
180  See MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: HOW THE DEAL 
WAS DONE 179–80 (2000).  
181  See SHOCH, supra note 169, at 158, 18082. 
182  For instance, Bush claimed that Clinton had “hemmed and hawed [on NAFTA] . . . . I guess as a 
candidate you can be on both sides of every question, but as a president you cannot.  You have to make 
the tough decisions.” David S. Broder, Bush Assails Clinton on Trade Policy; Plan to Raise Taxes on 
Foreign Firms Would ‘Destroy Jobs,’ WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1992, at A1; see also CAMERON & 
TOMLIN, supra note 180, at 180–81 (“Bush . . . accus[ed] Clinton of trying to favor NAFTA and oppose 
it at the same time . . . .”).  
183  In the second presidential debate, for instance, President Bush seemed to hammer home the 
question of Clinton’s indecision on NAFTA for maximum effect: 
But the big argument I have with the governor on this is this taking different positions on different 
issuestrying to be one thing to one person here that’s opposing the NAFTA agreement and then 
for itwhat we call waffling.  And I do think that you can’t turn the White House into the Waffle 
House. You’ve got to say what you’re for . . . . 
President George H.W. Bush, Statement at the Second Presidential Debate (Oct. 15, 1992) (transcript 
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/debatingourdestiny/92debates/2prez1.html). 
184  See SHOCH, supra note 169, at 158–59.  
185  See id.; see also CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 180, at 180–81 (arguing that Clinton used the 
side agreements to assuage concerns on labor and the environment). 
186  See SHOCH, supra note 169, at 15960. 
187  Indeed, as U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor observed, ratification of NAFTA in 1993 
would have been politically difficult under any Republican president.  See id. at 185; see also CAMERON 
& TOMLIN, supra note 180, at 181 (arguing that NAFTA would have failed if Bush were elected without 
a Republican majority in Congress).  
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recognized the political value of using NAFTA to exploit cleavages within 
the Democratic Party that they believed could make it difficult for Demo-
crats to turn out their trade union base that November.   
By the time Clinton took the oath of office in 1993, the question of 
NAFTA ratification had already been foisted squarely onto the legislative 
agenda.  Since President Bush had already signed the treaty in December 
1992, ignoring the issue was no longer an option for Clinton.  He had to 
make a choice either way, and each possible course of action was fraught 
with the risk of alienating a significant part of his party’s base.  Nonethe-
less, Clinton decided to stake much of his political capital in favor of ratifi-
cation and was personally involved in trying to usher the pact through 
Congress.188  But it is probably an exaggeration to attribute Clinton’s deci-
sion to back NAFTA largely to institutional factors such as the differences 
of constituencies faced by presidents and members of Congress.  In the end, 
Clinton was already a member of the business-oriented coalition within the 
Democratic Party before his campaign for the presidency, and his prefe-
rences on international trade mirrored those preferred by that coalition.  To 
placate the concerns of the more dominant anti-NAFTA coalition within his 
own party, however, he worked through the spring of 1993 to include side 
agreements that would establish commissions authorized to investigate and 
enforce violations of environmental and labor standards.189  But a sufficient 
number of pro-NAFTA Republican senators were intensely opposed to 
these side agreements and threatened to withhold their support if the agree-
ments were part of the package.190  Caught between a rock and hard place, 
the Clinton Administration agreed to water down the power of these pro-
posed commissions to allow them only to inquire and study alleged viola-
tions without providing them with any real enforcement authority.  That 
compromise was not enough to satisfy most of the key labor groups, how-
ever, and they mounted an intense lobbying campaign against ratification.191  
But despite their opposition, Clinton was able to pick up enough wavering 
Democrats to ensure the bill’s passage.192  
Ultimately, however, NAFTA ratification was the product of a largely 
skewed partisan vote in Congress, with a significant majority of Republi-
cans (seventy-five percent) voting in favor and with sixty percent of Demo-
crats against193 despite Clinton’s Democratic leadership from the White 
House.  In many respects, the NAFTA vote seemed to vindicate a tradition-
al parties-as-agent account, with Republicans being more responsive to in-
 
188  See SHOCH, supra note 169, at 177. 
189  See id. at 175–76.  
190  See id. at 176–77. 
191  See id. at 176. 
192  See id. at 183–85. 
193  The vote breakdown along partisan lines was 132–43 Republicans in favor, while Democrats 
were against it 102–156.  Id. at 183–84.  
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ternationally oriented business groups seeking market access, whereas 
Democrats were much more responsive to labor interests such as the AFL–
CIO.  In addition, some Democrats probably jumped ship on NAFTA to 
avoid handing President Clinton an embarrassing defeat on one of his key 
legislative initiatives, but these same Democrats might have been less san-
guine about supporting NAFTA had it been pushed by a Republican presi-
dent.194 
Reeling from their defeat in NAFTA, both the prolabor liberal wing of 
the Democratic Party and their organized labor constituencies were much 
better prepared to block the passage of future regional trade agreements 
during the rest of Clinton’s Administration.  For instance, the AFL–CIO 
proved to be much more influential in thwarting Clinton’s efforts to seek 
fast-track authority in 1997, with seventy-nine percent of House Democrats 
opposing an extension of negotiation authority.195  Furthermore, labor 
groups affiliated with the Democratic Party scored another decisive victory 
against the expansion of NAFTA in 1998.  This time, however, it was the 
House Republican leadership that took the initiative to introduce fast-track 
authority legislation for President Clinton, probably hoping to provoke a di-
vision between the House Democrats and the White House during the mid-
term elections that year.196  Again, despite a bill that would ostensibly give 
the Democratic Clinton more authority in international affairs, opposition 
by House Democrats was both broad and intense, with only about fifteen 
percent of Democrats voting in support of the measure.197  In both of these 
cases, a significant majority of House Republicans proved to be eager to 
lend their support to Clinton198 presumably because they believed that fast-
track authority would advance the cause of their favored constituencies and 
hurt the cause of Democratic-leaning labor constituencies even if the indi-
vidual occupying the White House belonged to the political opposition.   
The politics of intracoalitional conflict might shed some light on why 
Democrats in Congress were able to forestall new fast-track legislation that 
would expand NAFTA but have been less successful in repealing or renego-
tiating NAFTA since then.  To put it bluntly, regardless of the party in the 
White House, the existence of significant Democratic legislative majorities 
 
194  See id. at 185. 
195  See James Shoch, Contesting Globalization: Organized Labor, NAFTA, and the 1997 and 1998 
Fast-Track Fights, 28 POL. & SOC’Y 119, 12730 (2000).  For clarification, “fast-track” procedures re-
fer to when Congress provides advance authorization to the President to negotiate trade agreements with 
other countries, which the President then submits to Congress for approval and implementation. Under 
such procedures, the President is assured of an up-or-down vote on the implementing legislation that he 
submits to Congress.  For a quick overview of the legal and historical origins of the fast-track procedure, 
see Steve Charnovitz, Book Review, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 153 (2007) (reviewing HAL S. SHAPIRO, FAST 
TRACK: A LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (2006)). 
196  See Shoch, supra note 195, at 136–37. 
197  Id. at 137. 
198  The Republican vote in favor of extending fast track in 1998 was 151–71.  Id. 
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might make it harder for new regional trade agreements to pass because the 
median House Democrat still appears to be unwilling to ignore the prefe-
rences of the party’s core labor constituencies.199  But once such regional in-
ternational trade agreements pass, Democrats might not necessarily seek to 
repeal them.  One explanation might be that while parties have an incentive 
not to push policies that are likely to alienate their core supporters, they also 
have an incentive to avoid pushing a policy agenda that is likely to trigger 
significant intrapartisan conflict.  Even if a Democratic congressional ma-
jority were able to muster enough numbers in the House to repeal or rene-
gotiate NAFTA, such an effort would likely set off an intense battle 
between Democratic centrists and trade unionists and thus undermine the 
party’s effort to win elections and push its policy agenda.  In this picture, 
removing the repeal of NAFTA from the legislative agenda could help both 
Democratic presidents and party leaders in Congress manage their party’s 
diverse coalitions without sacrificing their ability to push other policy goals 
in which there might be broader intrapartisan agreement (or at least less in-
tense disagreement) such as health care or financial service reform.200  Per-
haps concerns about intrapartisan conflict might explain why criticism of 
NAFTA was popular among Democratic presidential candidates campaign-
ing in the rust belt during the 2008 primary election season201 but the issue 
of repealing or renegotiating NAFTA quietly receded into the background 
once President Obama entered the White House in 2009. 
In the end, the ratification of NAFTA presented the prospect of cross-
coalitional bargaining opportunities in which probusiness Democratic lead-
ers could join forces with Republicans to support an agreement that en-
trenched their preferences at the expense of prolabor Democrats who 
nonetheless represented a bigger and stronger coalition within the Demo-
cratic Party.  But it is precisely this cross-coalitional dynamic that makes 
agreements like NAFTA politically sustainable across multiple electoral pe-
riods.  The flip side is that one cannot presume that regional trade agree-
ments like NAFTA will continue to withstand repeal simply because such 
agreements provide substantial benefits to powerful export-oriented indus-
try groups, especially if such groups cease to play a key role in the intracoa-
 
199  Take the legislative ratification of NAFTA, for instance.  Despite significant lobbying by busi-
ness groups, more Democratic members of Congress appear to have been more responsive to labor con-
cerns than to those of the business wing of the Party. 
200  To be sure, agreements like NAFTA can also help Democratic presidents, who have stronger 
free trade preferences than the median House Democrat, avoid unpleasant intrapartisan conflicts.  With 
an agreement like NAFTA already in place, for instance, a future business-oriented Democratic presi-
dent might be able to rationalize painful policy measures that hurt the party’s core labor constituents in 
the name of enforcing the agreement.  In such a case, trade unionists within the party might be less will-
ing to withdraw support from a Democratic president in the face of bad policy outcomes.  
201  See Michael Luo, Despite Nafta Attacks, Clinton and Obama Haven’t Been Free Trade Foes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at A23 (“As they have tussled for votes in economically beleaguered Ohio, 
Senators Barack Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton have both excoriated the North American Free 
Trade Agreement while lobbing accusations against their opponent on the issue.”). 
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litional politics of the Democratic Party.  Take, for instance, a scenario 
where a majority of the probusiness Democrats in Congress lose their seats 
in a specific election cycle and are replaced by liberal prolabor Democrats 
or conservative Republicans.202  In such a scenario where significant intra-
partisan conflict can be avoided, a Democratic administration under united 
government may very well consider repealing, or at least renegotiating, 
NAFTA, especially the side agreements dealing with the protection of labor 
and environmental standards.203 
 
 * * * 
 
To summarize, opportunities for cross-partisan bargaining might help 
explain the different political trajectories in the United States of the postwar 
human rights treaties and the passage of NAFTA in 1993.  Both kinds of in-
ternational agreements were plagued by distributive partisan conflicts that 
tracked the divergent preferences of interest groups associated with both of 
the major political parties.  In the first case, however, the absence of cross-
partisan policy-bundling opportunities between Republican- and Democrat-
ic-leaning interest groups not only thwarted the possibility of the ratifica-
tion of the postwar human rights treaties but also provoked a constitutional 
amendment movement by conservatives who viewed these postwar treaties 
as vehicles that would provide one-sided benefits to progressive constituen-
cies.  In the case of international trade, however, the presence of a cross-
partisan coalition uniting the probusiness wing of the Democratic Party and 
traditional free-market Republicans made NAFTA electorally sustainable, 
even though it was disfavored by a majority of congressional Democrats 
and their labor-oriented constituents.  
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION—A NATIONALIST VERSUS 
COSMOPOLITAN DIFFERENCE? 
This Article has proposed that a combination of policy-seeking and of-
fice-seeking motivations have propelled the Republican and Democratic 
Parties to take distinct and often conflicting visions on the role and value of 
both international institutions and international legal commitments.  More 
importantly, it has suggested that some of the motivations for these differ-
ences—including the ideological or policy aspects—are rooted in consid-
erations of partisan issue ownership.  In other words, each of the major 
 
202  For instance, the fact that the House Democratic caucus had become more uniformly prolabor 
with the 1996 election helped doom Clinton’s quest for fast-track authority in 1997.  As Shoch observes, 
many of the centrist Southern Democrats who helped ratify NAFTA in 1993 had either lost their seats or 
retired.  See Shoch, supra note 195, at 130. 
203  Indeed, the question of renegotiating the environmental and labor side agreements was a recur-
ring theme during the 2008 presidential election.  See Elisabeth Malkin, Revisiting Nafta to Cure Manu-
facturing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2008, at C7. 
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parties favors international commitments that highlight or entrench issues 
they own from an electoral perspective but opposes such commitments that 
favor issues owned by the political opposition.   
An alternative explanation may be that the differences between Repub-
licans and Democrats are best defined by a nationalist–internationalist con-
tinuum, with Republicans being more nationalist and inward-looking and 
Democrats being more internationalist and cosmopolitan.  For instance, Da-
vid Lumsdaine has suggested that left-leaning parties tend to exhibit a more 
outward international orientation as shown by their greater support for for-
eign aid programs.204  Other scholars have suggested a connection between 
conservative idealism and resistance to international legal institutions.205  
Whereas such considerations may sometimes play a role in understanding 
partisan preferences for foreign policy, they are hardly sufficient.  At bot-
tom, although parties may sometimes couch opposition to international or-
ganizations and international legal commitments in terms of the loss of 
sovereignty, it is not clear they are concerned about the loss of sovereignty 
for its own sake.  Republicans seem to be content with constraining sove-
reignty through international legal institutions or agreements when doing so 
favors issues they own, such as free trade and the property rights of inves-
tors.206  Conversely, Democrats seem to be more sanguine about an interna-
tional legal agreement if it advances issues of primary interest to their core 
constituents, such as human rights, social welfare, and labor standards, but 
less so if the agreement advances free trade.207  Moreover, even when one 
disaggregates issues that purportedly favor one party, such as human rights, 
one notices even more fine-grained partisan distinctions.  Traditionally, Re-
publicans have tended to sound a cautious note about using American pow-
er to promote human rights abroad.208  Nonetheless, the Republican 
platforms in 1980 and 1984 accused the Democrats of not being sufficiently 
solicitous of the human rights of citizens in Soviet Bloc states,209 and the 
 
204  See DAVID HALLORAN LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE FOREIGN 
AID REGIME, 1949–1989, at 139, 144 (1993) (observing that parties and elites associated with the left 
tended to be more open to foreign aid). 
205  See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra note 5, at 297–99 (describing “conservative idealism” as the notion 
that the United States should mount an uncompromising defense of its independence and sovereignty).  
206  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
207  See discussion supra Part III.A.  
208  See Jerome J. Shestack, Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect, 28 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 907, 908 (1988) (observing early hostility by the Reagan Administration to Carter’s focus on 
human rights).  But some commentators observed that there was a subsequent turnaround in which the 
Reagan Administration became more amenable to emphasizing human rights as part of its foreign policy 
agenda, although such emphasis tended to focus on human rights abuses in communist or leftist regimes.  
See id. at 908–09.   
209   Republican Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT 
(July 15, 1980), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844; Republican Party Platforms: 
Republican Party Platform of 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 20, 1984), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25845. 
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1996 Republican platform also accused the Clinton Administration of not 
doing enough to protect the rights of Christians victimized by the Sudanese 
civil war.210 
Finally, even within the context of a single international legal regime, 
one may still observe the evolution of partisan preferences if the emphasis 
on issues within that regime changes.  For example, take British partisan 
preferences towards the European Community (EC).  In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, at a time when the core mission of the EC was promoting free 
trade, the Tories championed a stronger EC.  The 1983 Tory manifesto 
warned that “[w]ithdrawal [from the EC] would be a catastrophe for this 
country. . . .  We would lose the great export advantages and the attraction 
to overseas investors which membership now gives us.”211  The Labour Par-
ty, though, considered the Treaty of Rome, which established the EC, to be 
a fundamental mistake and sought immediate withdrawal: 
The next Labour government, committed to radical, socialist policies for reviv-
ing the British economy, is bound to find continued membership [in the EC] a 
most serious obstacle to the fulfillment of those policies. . . .  For all these rea-
sons, British withdrawal from the Community is the right policy for Brit-
ainto be completed well within the lifetime of the parliament.212   
But fifteen years later, the parties had switched their positions.  By the 
1990s, the Tory manifestos were decidedly more Euro-skeptic in tone, and 
the 1997 manifesto pledged, “We will not accept other changes to the Trea-
ty that would further centralise decision-making, reduce national sovereign-
ty, or remove our right to permanent opt-outs.”213  Meanwhile, Labour was 
more sympathetic to a stronger EU that could influence domestic social pol-
icies.214  So what changed?  By the 1990s, the EU’s core competence had 
extended to social and employment policies, especially with the introduc-
tion in 1989 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
 
210   Republican Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1996, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT 
(Aug. 12, 1996), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848. 
211  British Conservative Party Election Manifesto, 1983: The Challenge of Our Times, POL. 
RESOURCES (1983), http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con83.htm. 
212  British Labour Party Election Manifesto, 1983: The New Hope for Britain, POL. RESOURCES 
(1983), http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab83.htm. 
213  British Conservative Party: Manifesto for 1997 General Election: You Can Only Be Sure With 
the Conservatives, POL. RESOURCES (1997), http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con97.htm 
[hereinafter 1997 Conservative Manifesto] (emphasis omitted).  
214  Labour Party Manifesto, General Election 1997: New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better, 
POL. RESOURCES (1997), http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm (“We support too the 
Social Chapter of the EU, but will deploy our influence in Europe to ensure that it develops so as to 
promote employability and competitiveness, not inflexibility. . . .  A Labour government will strengthen 
co-operation in the European Union on environmental issues, including climate change and ozone deple-
tion.”). 
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Workers.215  Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher disparagingly la-
beled this new key plank of EU social policy as the “Socialist Charter,”216 
and her conservative government refused to sign onto this new key plank of 
EU social policy.217  But the Labour Government of Prime Minister Tony 
Blair reversed course in 1997 when it signed onto the “Social Chapter” pro-
vision of the Maastricht Treaty,218 which incorporated the 1989 Social Char-
ter.219  In sum, as the competencies of the EU shifted to cover issues that 
largely favored left-leaning parties, the Tories’ initial enthusiasm for the 
European integration waned, and nowadays a key plank of the Tory mani-
festos is linked to resisting EU intrusions on British sovereignty. 
One may then pose the following counterfactuals: if the next series of 
U.N. Human Rights Conventions pledge to protect property rights and pro-
mote religious freedom worldwide, will Republican platforms challenge 
such Conventions as intrusions on American sovereignty and resist ratifica-
tion by the U.S. Senate?  Or conversely, if the U.N. General Assembly 
passes a resolution recognizing the sanctity of life and urges member states 
to promote abstinence as a measure to reduce the number of abortions each 
year, will Democratic platforms still openly endorse the United Nations as 
an important institution for advancing world peace and justice?  Neither of 
these scenarios seems very likely.  What is distinctive about modern inter-
national legal institutions and international commitments is that, although 
they can be couched as solutions to global cooperation or coordination 
problems, the scope of the underlying issues they address is often highly 
contested by domestic groups.  As a result, political parties will often have 
intense and conflicting interests in shaping the agenda underlying such is-
sues in their favor. 
 
215  Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (adopted Dec. 9, 1989), available 
at http://www.aedh.eu/The-Community-Charter-of.html. 
216  Margaret Thatcher, Speech to Conservative Candidates Conference (Mar. 22, 1992) (transcript 
available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108294). 
217  See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., From the Social Charter to the Social Action Program 1995-1997: 
European Union Employment Law Comes Alive, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 43, 52–53 (1996) (discussing 
the legal implications of Britain’s refusal to sign or give enforcement to the Charter).  The Conservatives 
also made opposition to the Social Charter a key plank of their 1997 Manifesto.  See 1997 Conservative 
Manifesto, supra note 213 (“The European social model is not social and not a model for us to follow.  
But if Britain signed up to the Social Charter it would be used to impose that model on us—destroying 
British jobs.”). 
218  See John Kampfner, Minister Backs EU Social Chapter, FIN. TIMES (Eur. ed.), Nov. 13, 1997, at 
8. 
219  The Social Charter was annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht and was included in the 1997 Treaty 
of Amsterdam.  For a detailed description of the history and impact of the Social Charter, see Dowling, 
supra note 217, at 43–45. 
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CONCLUSION WITH POLICY AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
A growing number of studies have suggested that domestic factors in-
fluence the preferences of states for international cooperation.220  This Ar-
ticle has extended that literature by exploring the role of partisanship in 
framing domestic support and opposition to specific international legal 
commitments.  Specifically, it suggests that if certain conditions hold, inter-
national law can be used as a vehicle to advance the partisan objectives of 
an incumbent government.  Alternatively, international legal commitments 
can be used to impose differential constraints on the ability of parties to 
campaign on (and carry out) their favored issues and projects.  By illumi-
nating the processes underlying the choice of partisan preference for inter-
national legal commitments, this insight questions the conventional wisdom 
that partisan politics stop at the water’s edge.  And although this Article 
does not purport to systematically evaluate these claims against the evi-
dence, the logic of the argument is sufficiently plausible and the case stu-
dies sufficiently diffuse to make it clear that the partisan calculus will 
sometimes play a key role in the choice of international legal commitments. 
This analysis has broader implications for our understanding of the ef-
ficacy of international legal regimes.  By demonstrating the importance of 
partisan politics in the actual choice of international legal commitments, 
this analysis suggests that whether future or existing international legal re-
gimes will actually work as intended may often depend on whether these 
regimes are congruent with the preferences of a cross-partisan coalition of 
domestic actors.  The question of efficacy is especially pronounced where 
domestic actors play a significant role in either implementing or enforcing 
international legal commitments.  Thus, to understand whether the United 
States (or some other country) will comply effectively with a future global 
climate change regime, we should focus not only on distributive disputes 
that occur at the interstate level but also on those that occur at the intrastate 
level among competing political factions from both major political parties.  
Moreover, in other contexts where electorally based incentives to renege on 
an international commitment track partisan preferences, we should be con-
cerned about whether reputation or other external enforcement options may 
be sufficient to induce compliance.  
This Article does not stake out a position on whether this partisan con-
nection to international legal commitments is normatively problematic.  
Nonetheless, it seems that we can identify, in an admittedly crude way, 
some grounds for concern.  As international legal and regulatory regimes 
continue to proliferate and touch on sensitive political issues like social 
rights and capital punishment, it may be inevitable that the distributive con-
sequences of these regimes will have significant effects on domestic poli-
tics.  But one may nonetheless hope that international legal regimes can be 
 
220  See discussion supra Part I. 
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politically sustainable and palatable to domestic audiences in ways that 
classic power politics arrangements are not.  Differential partisan con-
straints and opportunities across various international regimes, however, 
may upset these expectations.  Viewed this way, the partisan dynamics un-
derlying international legal commitments can be harmful.  In the domestic 
context, John Ferejohn has pointed out some obvious problems that arise 
when legal regimes and courts become intensely politicized: “It has the ef-
fect of . . . making judicial decisions appear to be politically motivated 
and . . . of reducing the legitimate abilities of the people or their representa-
tives to legislate, and, less often, of provoking crude and heavy-handed 
electoral responses.”221   
But beyond those concerns, there is the additional problem that interna-
tional law partisanship can be a two-way street.  Just as one party may 
sometimes seek to use international law to advance its narrow partisan pre-
ferences, another party may also seek to block the adoption of an interna-
tional legal commitment that happens to provide distributive benefits to its 
political adversary even if the commitment ostensibly resolves some ge-
nuine global cooperation or coordination problem.  In this picture, the real 
casualty will likely be the efficacy of international law as a binding con-
straint on the behavior of nation-states.  Perhaps a plausible institutional 
path towards depoliticization may be to make sure that international legal 
commitments enjoy the support of legislative supermajorities; ironically, 
such an institutional approach—although increasingly criticized and sides-
tepped in the modern era222—already exists in the United States.  It is found 




221  John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politcizing Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 65–66 
(2002).   
222  See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmak-
ing in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1280 (2008). 
223  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
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